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ABSTRACT
Coverage analysis is critical in pre-silicon verification of hardware designs for
assessing the completeness of verification and identifying inadequately exercised
areas of the design. It is widely integrated in the simulation based verification flow
in the hardware industry. In this thesis, we provide solutions to enable effective
coverage analysis in assertion based and emulation based verification.
We introduce two practical and effective code coverage metrics for assertions:
one inspired by the test suite code coverage reported by Register Transfer Level
(RTL) simulators and the other by assertion correctness in the context of formal
verification. We present efficient algorithms to compute coverage with respect
to the proposed metrics by analyzing the Control Flow Graph (CFG) constructed
from the RTL source code. We apply our technique to a USB 2.0 design and an
OpenRISC processor design and show that our coverage evaluation is efficient and
scalable. We also present a technique to evaluate and rank automatically generated
assertions based on fault coverage.
We present a novel technique to extract code coverage from emulation plat-
forms. Using our CFG framework, we identify conditions or decision nodes and
map them to other statements in the code. Triggering of decision nodes is recorded
using additional trigger logic during emulation and mapped back to the source
code to obtain coverage information. We apply our technique to an industrial de-
sign and show that it can efficiently provide fairly accurate code coverage statistics
with minimal overheads during emulation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Pre-Silicon Verification
With advances in semiconductor process technology, modern chips have become
extremely complex, containing a few billion transistors and integrating a variety of
hardware modules on a single die. Due to this ever increasing design complexity
coupled with the huge costs associated with correcting hardware bugs, it is crucial
to ensure design correctness prior to putting it in silicon. As a result, pre-silicon
design verification today consumes the most computational resources and time
in the chip development life cycle [1]. Its main objective is to ascertain that the
design is behaving correctly, i.e. according to its specification. This objective is
achieved by taking the design through various steps such as simulation or dynamic
validation, formal verification, emulation and prototyping.
Most pre-silicon verification activities employ hardware designs described at
the Register Transfer Level (RTL). At this level, Hardware Description Languages
(HDLs) such as Verilog [2] and VHDL [3] are used to describe the design.
Simulation based verification involves running a set of tests1 or a test suite
through software simulation of RTL designs. The simulation output is checked
against expected results with the help of variety of testbench checkers to deter-
mine whether the design is behaving correctly. The tests can be generated by
pseudo-random test generators or are handwritten by the designers or verification
engineers based on the functional specification of the design [4]. The latter are
known as directed tests. Simulation based verification remains the most impor-
tant component in the pre-silicon verification phase in the hardware industry [5].
Assertions represent desirable properties that a designs should satisfy. Assertion
Based Verification (ABV) [6, 7] involves the use of assertions in formal verifica-
tion as well as simulation to check if a design complies with its specification.
1Here we refer to pre-silicon verification stimuli and not post-manufacturing tests.
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Formal verification statically analyzes the state space of the design to check if an
assertion can ever be violated. When an assertion fails, formal verification tools
provide a counterexample to show how the assertion can be violated. In simula-
tion, assertions are continuously checked and an error is flagged when any asser-
tion is violated. Synthesized assertions can also be used in emulation and silicon
debug [8]. With increasing design complexity and the advent of modern Hardware
Verification Languages (HVLs) such as Property Specification Language [9] and
SystemVerilog [10], ABV has steadily gained popularity in recent years [11].
Emulation and prototyping platforms such as those based on Field Programmable
Gate Arrays (FPGAs) have gained popularity to accelerate verification in recent
years [12–17]. The primary motivation for using these platforms is speed: runtime
of a test during emulation is orders of magnitude lower compared to simulation.
For example, we found that for an industrial design, running a test in emulation
was up to 360x faster than in simulation. The difference in runtimes becomes even
more pronounced with increasing design complexity. The downside of emulation,
however, is that it fails to provide complete visibility into the design.
1.2 Role of Coverage in Verification
Verification aims to ensure correctness of a design with respect to its specifica-
tion. However, verification is only as effective as the test suite and the set of
assertions used. For example, consider a test suite for a design containing a large
number of tests, all exercising the True branch of an if condition in the de-
sign source code. Even if all the tests pass (produce correct output), the False
branch is never exercised. Therefore, a bug existing in that portion of the code
can escape the verification efforts. This leads to the following important ques-
tions: Is the test suite sufficient to ensure correctness? Have enough assertions
been written and verified? How much of the design behavior has been verified?
With ever increasing design complexity leading to enormous design state spaces,
these questions are very difficult to answer. As a result, coverage achieved during
verification plays a key role in determining the quality and completeness of veri-
fication results. Coverage analysis helps in quantifying verification completeness
and identifying unexplored and untested parts of the design [5, 18, 19].
Each test in simulation based verification induces a different execution of the
design, and a design can be guaranteed to be correct if it behaves as required for
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all such possible tests. However, due to extremely high design complexity, only
a subset all possible executions of a design can be checked in practice. Although
the test suite is chosen so that the verification would be as exhaustive as possible,
design errors in the untested parts of the design may still escape the verification
process. As a result, measuring the exhaustiveness of the test suite becomes criti-
cal to judge verification progress. Coverage analysis proves to be an effective tool
for this task.
A related problem in formal verification is to measure the exhaustiveness or
completeness of specification as defined by the set of assertions. An erroneous
design behavior can escape the formal checks if it is not captured by the specifi-
cation. Indeed in the majority of cases, the specification is manually written by
a designer, due to which its quality depends on the competence of the designer.
Determining the behaviors covered by the specification is therefore indispensable
in this case as well.
Coverage of a test suite or assertions is a broad term encompassing different
aspects of the design that are verified. For example, it may correspond to the parts
of the design source code exercised by a test suite, or to the fraction of design
states or state transitions. It may even correspond directly to important design
behaviors as identified by a designer. This has led to a wide variety of coverage
metrics often orthogonal to each other [18]. We survey the various metrics in
Section 1.3.
Coverage analysis not only helps in quantifying the progress of various veri-
fication activities, but can identify inadequately verified design aspects as well.
Identification of such coverage holes guides future verification efforts in the right
direction. Additional tests or assertions can then be written to fill these holes.
Such a coverage guided approach leads to more systematic verification efforts
and ensures optimal use of resources. From a more philosophical point of view,
coverage analysis provides an answer to the fundamental question: Does the de-
sign meet its specification completely? The ultimate goal is to achieve coverage
closure, i.e. to exhaustively verify the entire design behavior.
3
1.3 Coverage Metrics
1.3.1 Coverage Metrics for a Test Suite
For conventional simulation based verification, a wide variety of coverage met-
rics have been proposed and are currently in use in the hardware industry. The
coverage metrics for a test suite can be broadly classified into six categories as
follows [5, 18].
• Code coverage metrics: Code coverage identifies the different structure
classes of the HDL program for the design that are exercised during sim-
ulation. The structure classes considered are statements, branches and ex-
pressions, each giving rise to a different metric. Code coverage metrics
are largely derived from software testing [20]. Since code coverage can be
easily related to the source code, it is relatively easier to fill the identified
coverage holes. Additionally, measuring code coverage adds little overhead
to simulation. Therefore, these are the most popular coverage metrics and
serve as a key sign-off criteria for ASIC tapeout in the hardware indus-
try. However, due to the inherent concurrency present in hardware designs,
achieving 100% code coverage does not guarantee complete functional cor-
rectness and more complex coverage metrics are required.
• Metrics based on circuit structure: These metrics refer to the circuit that
describes the design and identify physical parts of the circuit (e.g. latches)
that are not exercised during simulation [21]. Measuring coverage w.r.t.
these metrics is easy; however, it is much more difficult to write tests to
fill the coverage holes. Eliminating false negatives in this case is also a
challenging task [5].
• Finite state machine based metrics: Finite State Machine (FSM) metrics
require state, transition or limited path coverage on an FSM description
of the design. Analyzing such a description for the full system is rarely
feasible; hence, these metrics are applied to smaller abstract FSMs either
hand-written by designers [21, 22] or automatically extracted from the de-
sign description [23]. Metrics in this category are superior to the code or
circuit based coverage metrics due to their ability to capture, albeit partially,
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the sequential behavior of the design. However, it is not straightforward to
interpret the coverage reports and write tests to improve coverage.
• Functional coverage metrics: For this class of metrics, a list of error-
prone scenarios or functionality fragments (also known as coverpoints)
is manually constructed by verification engineers or automatically extracted
from the RTL description of the design [24]. Coverage is computed based
on the fraction of the coverpoints exercised during simulation. Identifying
such coverpoints, however, is a laborious manual task requiring in-depth
understanding of the design. Since coverpoints can be thought of as asser-
tions, functional coverage is also referred to as assertion coverage, not to
be confused with the coverage of the assertions themselves.
• Observability coverage metrics: The coverage categories described thus
far are based on the activation of different aspects of the design during sim-
ulation. These collectively determine controllability coverage of verifica-
tion [25]. On the other hand, observability coverage checks if the effects
of errors activated by tests can be observed at the design outputs [26, 27].
These are relatively recent coverage metrics.
• Fault coverage metrics: Fault (error) coverage analysis involves injecting
faults into the design according to different models and checking if it
causes erroneous behavior [28]. The fault coverage of a test denotes the
fraction of faults for which the test fails, or catches the fault. These metrics
model a design error by a local mutation in a design description format
such as a net list, HDL code fragment, or state transition diagram. They
are inspired from software testing [29] and post-manufacturing testing of
hardware [30].
Table 1.1 summarizes the most widely used coverage metrics for pre-silicon
verification in the hardware industry.
Determination of the coverage of a test suite when it is applied to a design
being emulated in a “black box” emulation environment is a daunting practical
challenge. Standard emulation platforms and tools are unsuitable for measuring
code coverage. In spite of this, some complex tests are run on emulators alone,
due to extremely long simulation runtimes. Currently, such tests are only used to
check functional correctness of the design but not for coverage. Since emulation
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Table 1.1: Summary of important coverage metrics for a test suite. For more
details and comparison between the different metrics, see [5] and [31].
Coverage metric Coverage
category
Description
Statement cover-
age
Code Statements executed during simulation.
Branch coverage Code Branches (if, case) that are com-
pletely exercised.
Expression
coverage
Code Expressions for which all possible ways
of evaluating it to each possible value are
exercised.
Toggle coverage Circuit Counts the number of times a circuit node
toggles, i.e. changes from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0.
State and transi-
tion coverage
FSM Measures the number of times each state
and state transition is exercised.
Functional cover-
age
Functional Records whether each manually speci-
fied error-prone scenario and functional-
ity fragment is exercised.
is able to run tests in a fraction of the time required for simulation, it should be
leveraged for coverage analysis as well.
1.3.2 Coverage Metrics for Assertions
Traditionally, coverage metrics for assertions (properties) in the context of formal
verification reason about the FSM model of a design [32–35]. Essentially, cover-
age is measured in terms of the number of states in the FSM model covered by the
assertions. The pioneering approaches of Hoskote et al. [32] and Katz et al. [33]
propose two distinct directions in defining and computing the state space based
coverage. The approach in [32] is based on mutations applied to the FSM. A state
is covered by a property if modifying the value of a variable in the that state causes
the property to fail formal verification. Katz et al. [33] define coverage based on
a comparison between the FSM and a reduced tableau of the property.
Fault or mutation coverage metrics have also been proposed for properties [36,
37]. These metrics use the number of faults or mutations detected as a notion of
coverage.
Modern verification flows integrate conventional simulation based verification
and formal property verification [21]. In order to get a unified picture of coverage
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achieved during verification, it is valuable to define assertion coverage metrics on
the lines of test suite coverage metrics and provide efficient methods to compute
them. Similarly to test suites, such analysis can direct verification engineers to
inadequately verified parts of the design for which more assertions need to be
written. Chockler et al. [18] present an important step in this direction by provid-
ing new coverage metrics in the context of formal verification corresponding to
the ones used for a test suite. The support provided by commercial tools in this
direction is limited (exceptions include [38, 39]).
Apart from judging verification completeness, coverage analysis of assertions is
essential to evaluate and rank the assertions themselves. This can help in identify-
ing a small set of high-quality assertions that can then be used in various stages of
the design cycle including simulation, formal verification, emulation and Silicon
debug. Such ranking is particularly valuable when assertions are automatically
generated [40].
1.4 Proposed Solutions for Coverage Analysis
In this work, we address the issues identified in Section 1.3 for coverage analysis
in the context of emulation and assertion based verification and provide effective
solutions for each of them.
1.4.1 Coverage in Assertion Based Verification
Firstly, we define two practical and effective code coverage metrics for assertions,
one for each setting in which assertions are primarily used: simulation and formal
verification. The simulation based coverage metric defines the coverage of an
assertion in terms of the code coverage of tests that trigger that assertion. The
correctness based coverage metric for an assertion focuses on the statements that
affect the correctness of that assertion. We thus focus on statement coverage of
assertions.
We present algorithms to compute coverage according to the proposed cover-
age metrics. The algorithms rely on statically analyzing Verilog RTL source code
for the design as a Verilog program [41, 42]. To facilitate this analysis, the de-
sign source code is represented as a Control Flow Graph (CFG) extended with the
7
information about variable dependencies which is required for coverage compu-
tation.
Our coverage definition and computation technique has key merits over the
state space based methods. Firstly, the constructed CFG is linear in the size of
RTL source code. Therefore, the cost of building a CFG is far less than a state
transition graph, and any manipulations of the CFG are also more scalable. Sec-
ondly, coverage reported in terms of lines of RTL source code is closer to the
designer and easier to interpret. On the other hand, state space coverage is not
easily translatable to source code. Lastly, in practical verification environments,
bridging coverage holes in an assertion suite can be easier when coverage infor-
mation is available in the form of lines of code. Since verification is a resource
and time intensive process, it is valuable to make coverage information easy to
understand and use. In addition, our technique can help in quickly determining
how modifications to an assertion suite can affect coverage.
We evaluate our correctness based coverage metric and analysis technique us-
ing a USB 2.0 protocol design and OpenRISC processor design from [43]. We
inject mutations into the covered statements and see if the assertion fails formal
verification in the mutated design. These experiments help show that the tech-
nique is scalable and efficient and correctly computes coverage according to the
proposed definition.
Finally, we study the use of fault coverage, or the number of faults detected by
assertions, as a metric to evaluate the assertions automatically generated by the
GoldMine tool [40, 44]. We model Single Event Upset (SEU) faults in the design
through mutation of the design source code. If an assertion is formally verified
true in the original fault-free design but fails formal verification in the faulty de-
sign, it is said to detect the injected fault. Moreover, the number of assertions
detecting a particular fault can be used to estimate the criticality of that fault w.r.t.
design outputs.
We present a formal analysis to explain how GoldMine assertions detect the in-
jected SEUs. We also show the effectiveness of our approach through experiments
on the SpaceWire communication controller design.
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1.4.2 Coverage in Emulation Based Verification
We apply our simulation based code coverage computation technique for asser-
tions to address the problem of coverage extraction from emulation and prototyp-
ing platforms. For each conditional statement in the source code, we identify a
corresponding set of statements using static analysis. These statements are such
that during running of a test, the condition evaluating to true during running of a
test ensures execution of the set of statements. Extra logic is added to the design
to record the evaluation of these conditions during emulation. The recorded in-
formation is post-processed to find the statements executed or covered during the
emulation. In order to limit the area overheads of the additional logic, the set of
conditions is optimized prior to emulation.
Our technique is targeted towards computing the statement coverage metric for
a test. Branch coverage can also be derived from the output of our technique.
Moreover, it should be noted that although we mainly consider FPGA based emu-
lation platforms, the technique can be readily applied to other hardware emulators.
This is due to the fact that the trigger logic to be added is expressed as synthesiz-
able Verilog code.
We demonstrate our technique on an industrial design emulated on a Xilinx
FPGA platform. The runtime of our technique was within 30 seconds for the de-
sign with a few thousand lines of source code, which shows that the technique is
scalable and efficient. The code coverage reported using our technique is com-
pared to that from an RTL simulator. We find that with around 10% FPGA usage
overhead, the error in reported coverage by our technique is within 2% on average.
Moreover, using optimization, the overhead can be reduced at the cost of slightly
higher error.
1.5 Summary
In summary, the main contributions of this thesis are as follows.
• We propose two code coverage metrics for assertions, applicable in each of
the two use cases: simulation and formal verification.
• We present an efficient technique to compute code coverage of assertions by
statically analyzing the RTL source code. Our technique presents statement
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coverage, which is easier to interpret for the designer as compared to state
space coverage.
• We provide an objective evaluation of automatically generated assertions
from the GoldMine tool based on fault detection and show how the same
analysis can also be employed to estimate criticality of faults.
• We provide a practical and efficient solution to the problem of extracting
code coverage from emulation and prototyping platforms using static anal-
ysis of design source code.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses previous
work related to the different components of the thesis. In Chapter 3, we describe
our approach of code coverage analysis for assertions. It includes definitions of
the proposed code coverage metrics, our CFG framework and the coverage com-
putation algorithms that utilize the framework. Chapter 4 explains our approach
of ranking assertions based on fault detection and estimating criticality of faults.
Our technique of code coverage extraction from emulation and prototyping plat-
forms is next explained in Chapter 5. Through a motivating example, we show
how CFG based static analysis can help extract code coverage efficiently. This is
followed by a detailed description of our methodology and experimental results
on an industrial design. We conclude in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
We consider previous work related to various parts of the thesis including cover-
age in verification, assertions and coverage analysis for assertions, fault criticality
evaluation, coverage during emulation and prototyping, and static analysis.
2.1 Coverage in Verification
As explained in Chapter 1, coverage analysis is indispensable to evaluate the ex-
haustiveness and quality of verification of hardware designs. Therefore coverage
metrics and coverage analysis techniques have been widely studied [5,18,19] and
incorporated in industrial design flows [4, 21, 24].
Tasiran and Keutzer [5] survey the myriad of coverage metrics for test suites
currently employed in simulation based verification. Code coverage metrics [31,
45] such as statement coverage and branch coverage refer to parts of the HDL
source for the design exercised during simulation. Metrics such as toggle coverage
identify physical parts of the circuit such as latches that are not fully exercised
[21]. FSM metrics measure coverage in terms of states and state transitions of
an abstract FSM model of the design. The model can be either hand-written by
designers [21, 22] or automatically extracted from the design description [23, 46–
48]. Hoskote et al. [23] present a technique of automatically extracting the control
flow of a design on the basis of the underlying mathematical model, independent
of the circuit description style. Other approaches [30,48] select state variables for
the automatically extracted FSM based on architectural information. Functional
coverage involves checking if manually or automatically identified error scenarios
are covered during simulation [24]. More recent metrics [26,27] take into account
observability information to determine whether effects of errors activated by a
test can be observed at the circuit outputs. Metrics based on fault models injecting
faults into the design and checking whether it causes erroneous behavior [28].
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Code and circuit coverage statistics are readily reported by most commercial
RTL simulators [49–51]. Code coverage analysis is done through instrumentation
based or dumpfile based techniques [31]. Instrumentation based techniques utilize
the Programming Language Interface (PLI) of simulators to measure the execution
statistics of the source code during simulation. Dumpfile based techniques com-
pute coverage statistics by post-processing of Value Change Dump (VCD) files
generated during simulation. Among the two methods, dumpfile based methods
incur much lower performance overhead during simulation, and different cover-
age metrics can easily be computed from the same dumpfiles.
Code, mutation and even functional coverage metrics are used in software test-
ing to evaluate the exhaustiveness of the test suite [20, 52, 53]. Zhu et al. [20]
survey the extensive research in this area. The code coverage metrics for simula-
tion based hardware verification are largely derived from those used in software
testing.
In Integrated Circuit (IC) manufacturing testing, fault coverage is used as a met-
ric to evaluate the effectiveness of test patterns to isolate a defective chip [54,55].
Guo et al. [56] compare the various fault models, e.g. stuck-at fault, bridging
fault and N-defect, used in post-manufacturing testing through analysis of large
amounts of production test data. Some of these fault models such as stuck-at fault
are also used in the context of pre-silicon verification. Moundanos et al. [30]
propose a unified framework for verification and post-manufacturing testing. It is
shown that the same abstraction techniques can aid Automatic Test Pattern Gener-
ation (ATPG) tools to attack hard-to-detect faults as well as provide a meaningful
measure of coverage for design verification.
2.2 Assertions
The idea of an assertion or property for checking correctness can be traced back
to Turing [57], where an approach of partitioning a large verification problem into
a set of assertions was first presented. Use of assertions to formally specify and
reason about programs was proposed by Floyd [58] and Hoare [59]. The onset
of HDLs first introduced assertions in the context of hardware design verifica-
tion. For instance, VHDL [3] ‘assert’ keyword provides a way of express-
ing a condition as property and checking if it is ever violated during execution.
Model checking [60] was proposed around the same time to formally check the
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correctness of a design w.r.t. specifications expressed in the form of assertions.
Modern verification processes involve the use of powerful HVLs such as PSL [9]
and SystemVerilog [10] that allow expressing complex assertions. Many commer-
cial tools now provide support for assertion based verification, where assertions
expressed in these HVLs are used in conjunction with simulation and formal ver-
ification [6, 7].
Writing assertions manually is a very difficult and laborious task. Various au-
tomatic assertion generation techniques have been proposed for software [61–64]
and hardware [40, 65–67] to alleviate this problem. These techniques use a dy-
namic or static analysis approach or their combination for assertion generation.
Early work with software assertion generation focused on extracting loop in-
variants or properties that hold across iterations of a while or for loop in the
program [68]. DIDUCE [61] is an online technique to learn invariants on variables
in the program at specific program points. Ammons et al. [63] present a machine
learning approach to discovering formal specifications of programs. Daikon [62]
discovers invariants by analyzing program execution traces and inferring invari-
ants based on predefined templates such as comparison with constant value, linear
relationships and ordering.
The IODINE tool [65] employs a template based dynamic approach similar to
Daikon to generate assertions for hardware. The templates used include one-hot,
mutual exclusion and request-acknowledge. A sequential data mining approach
to extract hardware assertions is proposed in [66]. GoldMine [40] uses a novel
combination of data mining and static analysis to generate assertions. The formal
verification step in GoldMine ensures that the generated assertions are true system
invariants. In this thesis, we evaluate and rank GoldMine assertions on the basis
of fault coverage.
2.3 Coverage Analysis for Assertions
Assertion or property coverage in the context of formal verification has been tra-
ditionally expressed in terms of the fraction of design states covered [32–35].
Coverage computation in this case typically depends on the analysis of the state
transition graph of the design or its variants. Hoskote et al. [32] present a mutation
based approach where a state is covered by a property if modifying the value of
a variable in that state causes the property to fail formal verification. This work
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was followed up in [34, 35]. Katz et al. [33] propose the use of a comparison be-
tween the FSM and a reduced tableau of the property to define coverage. In our
coverage analysis technique, we do not construct a state transition graph from the
RTL design, but instead perform an analysis of the Verilog Hardware Description
Language (HDL) source code for the design considered as a Verilog program as
in [41, 42].
Recent approaches [18, 69] attempt to relate coverage metrics from formal and
simulation based verification. For each of the simulation based coverage metrics,
[18] presents a corresponding metric suitable for assertions in formal verification.
To compute coverage of an assertion, statements in the code are removed one at
a time, and the assertion is checked for vacuity in the mutant design. Although
a pioneering approach to code coverage of assertions, it becomes intractable as
size of the design source increases. In contrast, our technique does not require
mutating every line and, since we analyze the CFG, the technique naturally scales.
In [69], the authors propose the use of a test plan language as a formal basis
for unifying the coverage goals for simulation and formal property verification.
However, the approach does not provide a way to map assertions to the design
source.
Some commercial formal verification tools have recently started providing code
coverage statistics for assertions in the context of formal verification through anal-
ysis of the state transition graph of the design [38,39]. We provide different cover-
age metrics for assertions applicable in simulation and formal verification. Based
on source code analysis, we also give efficient techniques of coverage computa-
tion which are inherently more scalable.
2.4 Fault Coverage and Criticality Evaluation
Simulation based approaches are typically used for fault experiments to determine
fault coverage of assertions [70]. Since our fault coverage evaluation method
uses formal techniques for all fault experiments, it accurately identifies the faults
detected by assertions. In [71, 72], formal methods have been used to inject soft
errors in RTL design and evaluate fault coverage, but the authors only consider
manually written assertions. We use an approach similar to [71] to evaluate the
automatically generated assertions from the GoldMine tool [40].
Our SEU fault criticality analysis can be thought of as a part of Soft Error
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Rate (SER) determination for digital circuits, which is widely studied at circuit,
gate and architectural levels [73–78]. Most approaches are simulation based and
study the probability of a transient fault at a circuit node getting latched in a flip-
flop/latch or the effect of soft errors visible at the architectural level. We define
the criticality of an SEU fault at a flip-flop/latch in terms of the number of paths
through which it can propagate to a design module output and use formal meth-
ods for criticality estimation. In [73], an analytical method is presented to ana-
lyze multi-cycle error propagation behavior to find fault criticality. Although the
method accurately computes propagation probabilities, the analysis is performed
at gate level. We reuse automatically generated RTL assertions for criticality esti-
mation.
2.5 Emulation and Prototyping in Verification and
Coverage
Use of emulation and prototyping platforms such as those based on Field Pro-
grammable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) to accelerate verification in the hardware indus-
try is widely studied [12–14]. Ray and Hoe [13] present a case study in developing
a synthesizable high-level model of a superscalar processor and producing a work-
ing prototype in FPGA. Emulation and prototyping is now commonly integrated
in industrial verification flows [15–17]. For instance, Gateley et al. [16] discuss
the experiences in applying emulation based techniques to aid design verification
of the UltraSPARC-I processor.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous approaches exist for extracting code
coverage from emulation platforms and which apply static analysis for this pur-
pose. The VN-Cover Emulator tool [79] enables code coverage extraction from
some emulation platforms such as Cadence Palladium and Cobalt using code in-
strumentation similar to coverage analysis by RTL simulators. Through the CFG
based analysis and decision node optimization, our technique for coverage extrac-
tion from emulation efficiently provides coverage statistics with minimal over-
heads.
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2.6 Static Analysis and Control Flow Graphs
In software, static analysis encompasses a family of techniques for automatically
computing information about the behavior of a program without executing it [80].
Static analysis techniques are used in a variety of fields including compiler opti-
mization [81], debugging [82], security [83], formal verification [80] and invariant
generation [64]. Many of these construct a Control Flow Graph (CFG) or its vari-
ants (e.g. Program Dependence Graph (PDG) [81]) from the program to facilitate
the program analysis. Program slicing [84], a static analysis technique that iden-
tifies program statements relevant to a particular computation, also uses CFGs.
High-level synthesis converts a system-level behavioral description into an RTL
description optimized for energy, power or area [85]. Control Data Flow Graphs
(CDFG) commonly serve as the intermediate representation of the system in this
case.
Static program analysis techniques have been adapted for hardware by treating
the HDL source for a design as a program [41,42]. Clarke et al. [41] propose using
a PDG [81] to represent each of the concurrent processes in the HDL source. The
PDG captures both control and data dependencies and thus is an extension of a
CFG. We use an extended CFG framework similar to a PDG for our code coverage
analysis techniques.
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CHAPTER 3
CODE COVERAGE ANALYSIS OF
ASSERTIONS
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present our work on code coverage analysis of assertions. In
particular, we consider statements coverage for assertions. We start by describing
our Control Flow Graph (CFG) framework to facilitate static analysis of Verilog
source code as a program [41] (Section 3.2). We then define simulation based and
correctness based code coverage metrics relevant to each of the two use cases of
assertions, viz. simulation and formal verification (Section 3.3). Using the CFG
framework, we present algorithms to compute coverage according to each of the
proposed metrics (Sections 3.4 and 3.5). We demonstrate experimental results on
a USB protocol design and the OpenRISC processor design in Section 5.4.
Our CFG framework consists of a CFG for each of the concurrent processes
in the design source. The CFG is further augmented with data flow information
in the form of variable dependencies. CFG for the design consists of the union
of CFGs for all processes in each of the design modules. Statements in the code
correspond to CFG nodes while branches correspond to edges. Thus, the CFG is
linear in the size of the design source.
Among the proposed coverage metrics, simulation based coverage metric de-
fines the coverage of an assertion to closely approximate the coverage of the tests
that trigger that assertion. On the other hand, the correctness based coverage
metric focuses on the statements that affect the correctness of that assertion.
In simulation based coverage computation, we identify the set of statements
such that triggering of the assertion (i.e. its antecedent evaluating to true) en-
sures execution of these statements. This set consists of the statements that must
be executed for the decision node to trigger (backward cone) and the statements
conditioned on the decision node (forward cone). The analysis is performed in a
way that the coverage from our technique closely approximates the code coverage
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reported by a simulator.
Correctness based coverage computation consists of an execution phase and
a coverage extraction phase. In the execution phase, assuming the antecedent
of the assertion holds, the CFG is used to explore all possible executions of the
RTL design over the number of cycles spanned by the assertion. During the CFG
traversal, important dependency information between statements is stored in the
form of triggers. These triggers are used in the coverage extraction phase to find
statements covered by the assertion.
We evaluate our correctness based coverage metric and analysis technique us-
ing a USB 2.0 protocol design and OpenRISC processor design from [43]. We
find that on average, only about 8% of the total statements were reported as cov-
ered by each assertion, which shows that our technique can effectively find the
statements truly relevant to the correctness of an assertion. We inject mutations in
the covered statements and see if the assertion fails formal verification in the mu-
tated design. These experiments help show that the technique correctly computes
coverage according to the proposed definition. For every assertion, mutations at
almost all covered statements were detected. Careful analysis of the source code
with the assertion shows that the mutations are not detected only in cases listed in
Section 3.5.
The simulation based coverage analysis is evaluated by applying it to solve the
problem of code coverage extraction from emulation and prototyping platforms.
3.2 Verilog RTL Source Code as a Control Flow
Graph
In order to facilitate analysis of the Verilog source code, we represent it as a Con-
trol Flow Graph (CFG). Each statement in the code is mapped to a node in the
CFG. A design is made up of a set of modules. Each module in turn consists of
a set of concurrently running always processes and assign statements. The
CFG for the module consists of the union of CFGs for each of these processes.
The set of CFGs for all modules thus completely captures the structure of the
design. It is similar to a Process Dependence Graph described in [41].
Each node in the CFG stores the number of the line in the RTL code it corre-
sponds to, as well as an expression for the RTL statement at that line.
An assignment node represents a blocking or non-blocking assignment in the
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Verilog code such as ‘a = 2’b01’ or ‘b <= 1’b1’. A decision node repre-
sents conditional statements, i.e. if and case statements in the source code.
Nodes other than assignment and decision nodes correspond to begin, end,
always @ (), etc.
Edges in the CFG represent the control flow between RTL statements. Each
assignment node has one outgoing edge that points to the node corresponding to
the next line in the RTL code. Each decision node has two outgoing edges left
and right that point to the RTL statements executed if the corresponding condition
is true or false, respectively.
The CFG is a purely syntactic representation of the RTL code. For effective
coverage estimation of assertions, we need to track dependencies between vari-
ables. The CFG is therefore extended with additional data flow information. The
resulting extended CFG is similar to the System Dependence Graph (SDG) for
VHDL introduced in [41] where the additional dependencies are represented as
flow edges. However, the data flow information we store is simpler and mainly
targeted towards the coverage estimation algorithm described later, in Section 3.5.
We store a list of variables used in the RTL code. The variables are classified
into inputs, outputs, internals and parameters. The dependence information for a
variable v is recorded in the form of initial assignment, decisions and assignments
as described below.
• Initial assignment: This is only valid if v is an internal or an output vari-
able of Verilog reg type. It points to the CFG node where the variable is
assigned its initial value. This is typically the value when the reset signal is
asserted, or in general, any value fully defined by inputs.
• Decisions: These are decision nodes which use v in the corresponding con-
dition in the RTL.
• Assignments: These are assignment nodes with assignments to v, or in gen-
eral, all assignments with v in the left hand side.
Example 1 Figure 3.1 illustrates the terms defined above with the help of an
example Verilog RTL code. The CFG for the module consists of the CFGs for the
two processes, viz. the continuous assignment on line 1 and the always process
starting at line 2.
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Figure 3.1: (a) Example Verilog RTL code for a design with inputs clk, rst,
output z and internal variables s, z r. (b) Control flow graph for the example
RTL design augmented with variable dependency information in the form of
assignments (solid lines) and decisions (dashed line) and initial assignment
(dotted line) for variables. For clarity, nodes containing only keywords such as
begin and end are not shown. Also, variable dependency information is shown
only for the internal variable s.
It can be seen that each statement in the RTL code is mapped to a node in the
CFG. Nodes corresponding to if (rst) and case (s) are decision nodes.
Each of these has corresponding end nodes which are not shown for clarity.
The data flow information in the form of variable dependencies is also shown in
Figure 3.1. Again for clarity, only the information for internal variable s is shown.
The node corresponding to statement s <= 0 on line 4 forms initial assignment
for variable s (dotted line). Variable s is used in the decision corresponding to
case (s) (dashed line) and assignments on lines 10 and 14 (solid lines).
3.3 Defining Code Coverage Metrics for Assertions
In this section, we define the two code coverage metrics for an assertion. We start
by introducing some relevant terms.
We consider assertions of the form ant ⇒ con, where the antecedent ant is a
conjunction of propositions and con is a single proposition. A proposition here
is of the form v == val where v is a variable in the RTL code. We also con-
sider temporal assertions, which are assertions spanning multiple clock cycles.
Assertions are represented in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [86] format.
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For example, following is an assertion for the design in Example 1.
¬rst ∧ s⇒ X(z)
In words, this assertion expresses the property: ‘if rst == 0 and s == 1 then
in the next cycle, z should evaluate to 1’.
An assertion is said to trigger when its antecedent evaluates to true.
We call the set of statements reported as covered by the assertion ‘a’ according
to our definition the result set of a. Therefore the proposed coverage metrics
provide a notion of statement coverage of an assertion.
3.3.1 Simulation Based Code Coverage
We define the simulation based code coverage of an assertion such that it closely
approximates the simulator statement coverage of a test that triggers the assertion.
Our coverage definition as well as coverage analysis ensures that the coverage
reported by our technique is an under-approximation or a conservative estimate of
the simulator coverage. In other words, if a statement is reported as covered by
our technique, it must be reported as covered by the simulator as well, while the
converse may or may not be true.
Definition 1 (Simulation based coverage) A statement s is covered by an asser-
tion a if it belongs to one of the following categories.
(1) s must be executed in order for the antecedent of a to evaluate to true.
(2) s is executed because the antecedent of a evaluates to true.
(3) s is executed irrespective of the evaluation of the antecedent of a.
(4) s does not belong to the above three categories, but execution of a statement
from (1) or (2) ensures the execution of s.
We call the set of statements falling in categories (1) and (2) as the backward
cone and the forward cone of the assertion, respectively. We use the term ancillary
cone to denote the statements belonging to categories (3) and (4).
Note that (3) includes continuous assignments as well as unconditionally ex-
ecuted statements in each always process. As an example of a statement in
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category (4), consider the following code snippet.
if (cond) begin
s1;
s2;
end
Suppose that s1 belongs to the backward cone of a decision node, but not s2.
However during simulation, s2 must be executed if s1 is executed. We include
s2 in the ancillary cone of the decision node.
Note that we include only those statements which are definitely executed, when-
ever a given assertion is triggered. As a result, if a test triggers a, the result set
of a is a subset of the set of lines covered by the test. If multiple tests trigger the
same assertion a, the result set is an intersection of the sets of lines covered by
each of the tests.
Since this definition depends only on triggering of an assertion, the consequent
as well as the correctness of the assertion is irrelevant to the coverage.
For the RTL design from Example 1, consider the following assertion:
a : ¬rst ∧ s⇒ X(z).
The assertion a triggers when the antecedent ¬rst ∧ s evaluates to true.
It can be concluded from Figure 3.1 that statements on lines 3, 8, 9 and 10 must
be executed prior to variable s getting the value 1. These belong to the backward
cone of a.
Statements on lines 3, 8, 13, 14 and 15 are executed due to the triggering of a,
i.e. due to the variables rst and s evaluating to 0 and 1, respectively. Therefore,
these statements are included in the forward cone of a.
Continuous assignments such as 1: assign z = z r; are executed irre-
spective of the triggering of a and therefore belong to category (3) from Defini-
tion 1. The statement 11: z r <= 0; is executed whenever line 10 is exe-
cuted and therefore belongs to category (4) from Definition 1. These statements
constitute the ancillary cone of a.
Figure 3.2 shows the CFG nodes covered by a in this case.
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Figure 3.2: CFG nodes covered by a according to the simulation based coverage
definition.
3.3.2 Correctness Based Code Coverage
In the context of formal verification, we define the coverage of an assertion based
on its correctness. Essentially, a statement is said to be covered if its correct
execution is necessary for the correctness of the assertion.
Definition 2 (Correctness based coverage) A statement s in the RTL source code
is said to be covered by assertion a if for some error or mutation injected at s, a
fails formal verification in the mutated design.
In this context, an error or mutation represents a logical bug such as an incorrect
value assigned to a variable.
Since this definition depends on the correctness of the assertion, the number
of cycles spanned by the assertion as well as the consequent are relevant to the
coverage.
In [18], a mutation based definition of code coverage of an assertion is pre-
sented. However, the mutation considered involves removing the statement, and
coverage is computed by checking if the assertion becomes vacuous in the mutant
design. We consider logical bugs as mutations and compute coverage through
analysis of the CFG for the RTL source code as described in Section 3.5.
Consider again the assertion a above for the code in Example 1. Statements
on lines 1, 3, 8, 13 and 15 are included in the result set of a according to the
correctness based definition.
Figure 3.3 shows the CFG nodes covered by a according to this definition.
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Figure 3.3: CFG nodes covered by a according to the correctness based coverage
definition.
Given that the antecedent ¬rst ∧ s holds, an error in one of these statements
can make the consequent false and therefore make the assertion fail. For example,
if the antecedent holds and either z r or z is not assigned to the correct value, it
will make the assertion fail.
A comparison between the result sets of a according to the two definitions show
that statements on lines 9, 10 and 14 are included in simulation based coverage
but not in correctness based coverage. Lines 9 and 10 fall in this category because
they are executed prior to the antecedent becoming true and hence are irrelevant
to the correctness of a. Line 14 is also unable to affect the correctness of a, and
therefore it is not included in correctness based coverage.
3.4 Simulation Based Code Coverage Computation
We now describe our algorithm to compute the coverage of an assertion according
to the simulation based coverage metric. Let a be an assertion for an RTL module
M with CFGG. LetBa, Fa andAa be the sets of statements in backward, forward
and ancillary cones of a, respectively. Let Sa be the result set of a. Then Sa =
Ba ∪ Fa ∪ Aa.
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3.4.1 Backward Cone
In order to find the statements in the backward cone of a, we look at each propo-
sition in a individually. We find the statements that must be executed for the
proposition to evaluate to true. Since a is a conjunction of such propositions, each
of these propositions must evaluate to true for a to trigger. Therefore, if a state-
ment must be executed for any of these propositions to evaluate to true, it must be
executed for a to trigger. As a result, the union of backward cones of propositions
gives the backward cone of a. We only consider propositions involving internal
variables or outputs in this analysis.
Procedure 1 describes how we obtain the backward cone of each proposition.
Consider a proposition p : (v == val). We first find CFG nodes which assign
the value val to variable v in GetMatchingAssignments() (Procedure 2). Apart
from direct assignment v <= val, we also look for indirect assignments, that is,
assignments of the form v <= v′ such that v′ in turn is assigned val directly or
indirectly. If val happens to be the initial value of v, the CFG node corresponding
to the initial assignment is immediately returned without further processing.
It is possible that v can be assigned val in multiple statements of a process.
Since our goal is to find the statements that must be executed for a to trigger, we
stop the backward traversal in such cases. Thus, we do not consider all possible
execution paths that lead to v being assigned the value val.
When there is exactly one matching assignment n, it is included in B. If it is an
indirect assignment, e.g. of the form v <= v′, a recursive call is made for a new
proposition p′ : (v′ == val).
Finally, all decision nodes that lie on the path from top level CFG node to the
node corresponding to n are also included in B.
3.4.2 Forward Cone
To compute Fa, we use the information provided by a in the form of propositions.
Since we assume that a has triggered, we have available a list of values L for some
of the variables.
We look at all always processes containing a decision involving some v ∈ L.
For each such process, we traverse the CFG starting from the top level node.
When a decision node is encountered, we attempt to evaluate the corresponding
conditional expression using the values in L. If it can be evaluated, we take the re-
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Procedure 1 Extract backward cone of proposition p : (v == val) in RTL module M
GetBackConeProposition(G, p)
Input: Extended CFG G of M , proposition p : (v == val)
Output: Set of statements B in backward cone of proposition p
1: B ← φ
2: N ← GetMatchingAssignments(p) {Find assignments that make p true}
3: if ‖N‖ = 1 then
4: {Continue if exactly one matching assignment exists}
5: Consider n : (v <= rhs) ∈ N
6: B ← B ∪ n
7: if ¬IsConstant(rhs) then
8: {Recursive call in case rhs is also a variable}
9: Let p′ ← (rhs == val)
10: B ← B ∪GetBackConeProposition(G, p′)
11: end if
12: while n 6= NULL do
13: {Include all decision nodes on which n depends}
14: if IsDecisionNode(n) then
15: B ← B ∪ n
16: end if
17: n← Parent(n)
18: end while
19: end if
Procedure 2 Get CFG nodes with assignments matching proposition p
GetMatchingAssignments(G, p)
Input: Extended CFG G of M , proposition p : (v == val)
Output: Set of CFG N nodes containing assignments matching p
1: N ← φ
2: if val = vinit then
3: N ← {Initial(v)}
4: else
5: for all n : (v <= rhs) ∈ Assignments(v) do
6: if rhs == val then
7: N ∈ N ∪ {n}
8: else
9: Let p′ ← (rhs == val)
10: Let N ′ ← GetMatchingAssignments(G, p′)
11: if {N ′} > 0 then
12: N ← N ∪ {n}
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
16: end if
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spective traverse along the respective edge. If the expression cannot be evaluated,
we stop the traversal. The statements mapped to the nodes encountered during
this traversal are included in Fa.
When the conditional expression for a cannot be represented as a conjunction
of propositions, we simply start at a and traverse downwards until another deci-
sion node is encountered. The statements corresponding to the visited nodes are
included in Fa.
3.4.3 Ancillary Cone
Extracting ancillary cone Aa consists of the following two steps, one for each of
the categories (3) and (4) from Definition 1.
i. Firstly, all continuous assignments are included in Aa. Then, starting at the
top level CFG node of each process, we traverse the CFG until a decision
node is encountered. Statements corresponding to all visited nodes are in-
cluded in Aa, since those are always executed irrespective of triggering of
a.
ii. For each assignment node in Ba, we first traverse the CFG upwards until
a decision node is reached. Statements corresponding to the visited nodes
are included in Aa, since those lines are executed whenever the original
assignment corresponding is executed. The same procedure is then repeated
for downward traversal starting from the assignment node.
3.5 Correctness Based Code Coverage Computation
This section describes our algorithm to extract the result set of an assertion ac-
cording to the correctness based coverage definition. It consists of two phases,
viz. the execution phase and coverage extraction phase.
Consider an assertion a : ant ⇒ con for module M , that spans k cycles.
Let V be the set of variables in M . For a k cycle assertion, con is of the form
XX . . .X(ktimes)(vout) or XX . . .X(ktimes)(¬vout), where vout ∈ V . Our
goal is to find Ca, the result set of a according to the correctness based coverage
definition. Procedure 3 describes how we compute Ca.
27
Procedure 3 Extract correctness based coverage of assertion a : ant ⇒ con in RTL
module M
GetFormalCoverage (G, a)
Input: Extended CFG for M (G), assertion a
Output: Set of lines Ca covered by a according to correctness based coverage definition
1: Btop ← ConstructV alueTable(G, a) {Execution phase: Construct a tree of value
tables for n cycles and record triggers}
2: Ca ← ExtractCoverage(G,Btop) {Coverage extraction phase: Find coverage of a
using value tables and triggers}
3.5.1 Execution Phase
In this phase, we execute the RTL for k cycles starting with the information in a
(Procedure 4). In this process, we record the following information:
• We construct ‖V ‖×k tables of values of variables in k cycles. In particular
the entryB[v, i] in a value tableB contains the value of variable v in cycle i.
In other words, a value table is a table of propositions (variable-value pairs)
in each of the k cycles. Multiple value tables correspond to different pos-
sible values of conditions corresponding to the decision nodes encountered
during execution that cannot be evaluated to true or false.
• Apart from value tables, we also record triggers for each decision or assign-
ment node that is visited. Triggers for a decision node are assignment nodes
that make the decision true. Triggers for an assignment node include other
assignment nodes which affect it and decisions nodes on which it depends.
When an assignment node n : (v <= rhs) is encountered during execution,
the value table B is updated with the value rhs if it is a constant. If it is not a
constant, assignments to rhs encountered thus far are added to the set of triggers
of n. The decision nodes on which this assignment depends are also added to the
set of triggers of n. Essentially, these are the decision nodes that lie on the path in
the CFG from n to a top-level node.
When a decision node n is encountered, we attempt to evaluate the condition in
n using the values available in B. If it evaluates to true, we update its triggers and
take the true branch in the CFG. If it evaluates to false, we take the false branch
without updating the triggers. If the decision is unknown due to a lack of sufficient
data in the value table, we split B into Bleft and Bright corresponding to the true
and false evaluations of n, respectively. As a result, at the end of the execution
phase, we obtain a tree of value tables rooted at Btop.
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Procedure 4 Construct a tree of value tables rooted at Btop using assertion a and record
triggers
ConstructValueTable (G, a)
Input: Extended CFG for M (G), assertion a
Output: Tree of value tables rooted at Btop, triggers recorded in G
1: Initialize(Btop, a) {Initialize root table of values (Btop) using a}
2: for cycle = 1→ k do
3: for all Leaf tables B in tree rooted at Btop do
4: for all Processes P in M do
5: n← top(P )
6: while n 6= NULL do
7: if IsAssignmentNode(n) then
8: Let n : (v <= rhs)
9: if IsConstant(rhs) then
10: {Update the value table}
11: B[v, cycle]← rhs
12: end if
13: UpdateTriggers(n)
14: n← left(n)
15: else
16: {Decision node}
17: if EvaluateDecision(n,B) = true then
18: UpdateTriggers(n)
19: n← left(n)
20: else if EvaluateDecision(n,B) = false then
21: n← right(n)
22: else
23: {Unknown decision}
24: (Bleft, Bright)← split(B)
25: end if
26: end if
27: end while
28: end for
29: end for
30: end for
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3.5.2 Coverage Extraction Phase
In the coverage extraction phase (Procedure 5), we look at each leaf B of the tree
of value tables in turn. If vout is assigned in cycle k in B and its value agrees with
con, we have found a possible execution starting from ant that makes con true. We
then include RTL lines for all nodes visited during this execution inCa. We use the
triggers recorded during the execution phase to traverse backwards recursively and
obtain such nodes. This is implemented by theBackwardTraversal() procedure
on line 7. Pseudocode for that procedure is not shown due to space constraints.
Procedure 5 Extract correctness based coverage from value table tree and triggers
ExtractCoverage (G,Btop, a)
Input: Extended CFG forM (G), tree of value tables rooted atBtop, assertion a : ant⇒
con
Output: Set of lines Ca covered by a according to correctness based coverage definition
1: Ca ← φ
2: Let p : (vout, val)← con
3: for all Leaf tables B in tree rooted at Btop do
4: if B[vout, k] = val then
5: {Value of vout exists and matches the consequent of a}
6: for all Triggers t of p do
7: Ca ← Ca ∪BackwardTraversal(t)
8: end for
9: end if
10: end for
Our correctness based coverage computation technique is guaranteed to find all
statements such that erroneous execution of these statements causes the assertion
to fail during formal verification. In some cases, our technique can report a state-
ment as covered, but no mutation to that statement can cause the assertion to fail
formal verification. This can only happen in the following two situations:
1. The mutation causes the assertion to be vacuously true. In this case, due
to the injected mutation, the antecedent of the assertion never evaluates to
true.
2. The mutation is masked by the logic and fails to affect the consequent and
hence the correctness of the assertion.
In these situations, our technique computes a superset of the target result set of
the assertion.
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Table 3.1: Number of lines of RTL code, number of RTL statements and the
number of assertions written for each module under consideration.
Module Lines Statements Assertions
usbf pa 257 134 4
usbf pd 277 135 4
usbf pe 620 302 5
usbf idma 301 158 4
usbf wb 137 53 4
or1200 dc fsm 176 99 3
or1200 except 357 151 3
3.6 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate our correctness based coverage computation technique
on a USB 2.0 protocol design and the OpenRISC processor design both from [43].
We demonstrate the simulation based correctness computation technique on an
industrial design in Chapter 5, where we apply it to solve the problem of coverage
extraction from emulation platforms.
In the USB design, we consider the packet assembler (usbf pa), the packet
disassembler (usbf pd), the protocol engine (usbf pe) and the internal DMA
engine (usbf idma) modules which form the protocol layer along with the wish-
bone interface module (usbf wb). We consider the data cache controller
(or1200 dc fsm) and the exception unit (or1200 except) from the Open-
RISC design. All experiments were performed on an Intel Core 2 Quad with
16GB RAM. Cadence Incisive Formal Verifier was used as the formal verifier.
Table 3.1 shows the number of lines of code and the number of RTL statements
relevant for code coverage for each module considered. The statements include
assignments and if and case conditional statements. For each of the seven
modules, we manually wrote 3 to 5 assertions spanning up to 7 cycles for a total
of 27 assertions. All assertions were formally verified against the corresponding
design modules.
For each assertion, we extracted the set of statements covered according to the
correctness based definition. Covered statements were mutated and the assertion
was run through the formal verifier again along with the mutated designs. Follow-
ing mutations were injected for each type of statement:
if conditions: The condition was negated, or in other words, the true and false
branches were flipped.
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case conditions: Code block corresponding to one case was interchanged with
that for another case.
Assignments: Right hand side of the assignment was changed, e.g. b = 0 was
changed to b = 1.
Table 3.2 shows detailed results for all assertions considered in this experiment.
Time and memory usage for coverage computation of every assertion is shown.
We also give the maximum depth of the value table tree constructed during the
execution phase (Section 3.5.1). Finally, we show the number of statements cov-
ered and number of statements such that a mutation injected at the statement is
detected, or in other words, the assertion fails formal verification with the mutated
design.
Recall that the value table tree depth is determined by the number of unknown
decisions encountered during the execution phase. The memory usage of coverage
computation can be attributed mainly to the CFG and the value table tree. As the
value table tree depth increases, the value table tree contributes towards most of
the memory usage. The current implementation of coverage computation is such
that the size of the value table tree is exponential in its depth. As a result, we can
see that for a given module, the total memory usage also increases exponentially
with the value table tree depth. For example, in the case of usbf pa, the memory
usage increases from 361 kB for value table tree depth of 1 (a3) to 1.24 GB for
value table tree depth of 14 (a4). In the future, we aim to make the value table tree
implementation more efficient and avoid this exponential memory cost.
The memory usage of coverage computation for a module averaged over all
assertions is found to increase with the size of the module. This can be attributed
to the larger CFG and value tables for larger modules with higher numbers of
variables.
Runtime of coverage computation also behaves in a way similar to memory
usage in that it increases with the size of the module and for a given module, with
the value table tree depth.
It can be seen that on average, only about 8% of total statements were reported
as covered by each assertion, which shows that our technique can effectively find
the statements truly relevant to the correctness of an assertion.
For every assertion, mutations at almost all covered statements were detected.
On careful analysis of the source code with the assertion, we find that the muta-
tions are not detected in only the situations mentioned in Section 3.5.
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Table 3.2: Results for each of the 27 assertions. Column three gives the length in
number of cycles of each assertion while column four gives the maximum depth
of the value table tree during coverage computation for that assertion. The time
and memory usage during coverage computation and the number of statements
covered are shown in the next three columns. Number of statements such that the
mutation injected in the statement was detected is shown in the last column.
Module Assertion Length
Tree
depth
Time
(s)
Memory
Covered
state-
ments
Mutations
detected
usbf pa
a1 1 13 0.18 83 MB 5 5
a2 2 2 0.01 416 kB 5 4
a3 3 1 0.01 361 kB 6 6
a4 4 14 2.78 1.24 GB 19 15
usbf pd
a5 1 3 0.01 589 kB 4 4
a6 2 5 0.02 1.49 MB 16 13
a7 3 1 0.02 625 kB 12 11
a8 4 10 0.11 53.3 MB 7 7
usbf pe
a9 2 5 0.05 8.4 MB 8 8
a10 2 4 0.03 1.64 MB 5 5
a11 3 5 0.05 16.1 MB 4 4
a12 4 7 0.15 66.3 MB 16 14
a13 7 18 8.09 3.2 GB 25 25
usbf idma
a14 1 17 0.52 251 MB 4 4
a15 2 13 0.05 19.5 MB 26 25
a16 3 15 0.2 89 MB 8 8
a17 4 5 0.01 3.46 MB 15 15
usbf wb
a18 1 2 <0.01 252 kB 5 5
a19 2 0 0.01 177 kB 7 7
a20 4 3 0.01 725 kB 5 5
a21 6 6 0.02 3.69 MB 18 17
or1200 a22 2 8 0.01 904 kB 7 3
dc fsm a23 3 5 0.01 1.6 MB 15 14
a24 4 1 0.01 472 kB 14 10
or1200 a25 2 9 0.02 4.57 MB 5 5
except a26 3 18 0.03 15.8 MB 8 3
a27 4 4 0.02 1.87 MB 8 8
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We now describe the results for assertion a2 for the USB packet assembler
module in further detail.
a2: rst ∧ tx ready ∧ (state = CRC2)⇒ X (state = IDLE)
Figure 3.4 shows the relevant part of the RTL code for the module, where the
statements covered by a2 are underlined. The lines of code shown constitute a
state machine with five states: IDLE, WAIT, DATA, CRC1, CRC2.
Figure 3.4: RTL code snippet from the USB packet assembler module relevant to
assertion a2: rst ∧ tx ready ∧ (state = CRC2)⇒ X (state =
IDLE). Statements reported as covered by a2 by our technique are underlined.
Each covered statement was mutated one at a time, as shown in Table 3.3.
We found that a2 failed formal verification in mutated designs with mutations
in lines 9, 12 and 14. For instance, consider the mutation to the assignment in line
14. In this case next state is assigned an the wrong value DATA instead of the
correct value IDLE. The erroneous value propagates to the variable state in the
next cycle which causes a2 to be false, since the consequent of a2 checks if the
state equals IDLE in the next cycle.
Mutation in the statement state <= next state (line 3) did not cause a2
to fail formal verification. Due to the mutation, the only values state can take
are: IDLE and DATA. Since the antecedent of a2 requires state = CRC2, it
never evaluates to true and a2 passes the formal verification vacuously.
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Table 3.3: Mutations injected in the statements covered by assertion a2 for the
USB packet assembler module. In the case of the mutation in line nine, the
statement IDLE: (not shown in Figure 3.4) was changed to CRC2: in turn. Thus
the code blocks corresponding to the IDLE and CRC2 cases were interchanged.
Line number Original statement Mutated statement
2 if(!rst) if(rst)
3
state <=
next state
state <= DATA
9 CRC2: IDLE:
12 if(tx ready) if(!tx ready)
14
next state =
IDLE
next state =
DATA
Mutation in if(!rst) (line 2) was also undetected. In this case, next state
had the value IDLE which is also the value of state on reset. Therefore state
was assigned value IDLE in both branches of the if statement. In other words,
the mutation was masked by the logic in the design and hence had no effect on the
correctness of a2.
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CHAPTER 4
FAULT COVERAGE ANALYSIS OF
ASSERTIONS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe our approach of fault coverage analysis and fault
criticality estimation. We consider the assertions automatically generated by the
GoldMine tool [40, 44]. The fault model considered for this analysis is the Sin-
gle Event Upset (SEU), which is typically used to model soft errors in hardware
designs [87].
4.1.1 GoldMine Assertion Generation Tool
Figure 4.1: GoldMine tool flow from [44].
In the GoldMine tool flow (Figure 4.1), a target RTL design is simulated for a
fixed number of cycles using random input patterns. The simulation traces gen-
erated are used as data by the data mining stage (A-Miner) comprising a decision
tree based supervised learning algorithm. Static analysis of the RTL design is car-
ried out in order to extract the set of variables which affect a design output. This
set is known as the logic cone of the output. A-miner is restricted to analyzing
the data only for the logic cone of an output. GoldMine can generate temporal
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assertions or sequential assertions, which are relevant for detecting SEUs. A min-
ing window length given to A-Miner provides the number of cycles for which the
design should be unrolled to capture sequential behavior. A-Miner guesses the
likely assertions in the design.
Formal verification is used to extract true assertions from the set of likely as-
sertions. The true assertions in an iteration are retained. The assertions that fail
the formal verification phase are poor guesses by the data miner. The formal ver-
ifier produces counterexample traces for every failed assertion. These traces are
appended into the simulation testbench in a following iteration of GoldMine. This
process is repeated until no assertions fail. The final set of true GoldMine asser-
tions is guaranteed to capture the complete functionality of a design output [44].
4.1.2 Fault Coverage and Criticality Evaluation
Since GoldMine automatically generates a large number of assertions for a design,
it is important to evaluate the quality of generated assertions. This evaluation can
be used to rank the assertions and only use the highly ranked assertions through
the various stages of verification. In [40], subjective ranking by designers is used
for this purpose. However, a more objective metric which can be automatically
computed is more valuable. To that end, in this work we evaluate the assertions in
terms of the number of faults they detect, using the SEU fault model.
Both our fault injection and fault coverage evaluation follow a formal approach
similar to [71]. We inject faults modeled as single event upsets (SEUs) into the
state variables (flip-flops/latches) in RTL, thereby creating a faulty design. We
use GoldMine to generate assertions for the fault-free design. The faulty design
is run with these assertions through a formal verifier. If an assertion that is true
in the fault-free design fails in a faulty design, it is said to detect the injected
fault. The faults covered by assertions in one iteration are removed from the set
of uncovered faults. This process is repeated until all faults are detected or until
no more counterexamples are generated by GoldMine.
The fault coverage analysis can also be turned around to estimate the criticality
of a fault. Assertions that detect a fault cover different paths in the design through
which the fault propagates to the output. Therefore, the number of GoldMine
assertions that detect a particular fault can provide an estimate of the criticality
or importance of that fault for overall design vulnerability to soft errors. These
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estimates can also be used for selective protection of flip-flops/latches [71,73,75].
In this work, we formally show how GoldMine assertions detect the injected
SEUs, by representing the fault-free and faulty designs as a finite state machine
(FSM). We demonstrate our technique on the SpaceWire [88] communication con-
troller design from OpenCores [43].
4.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we describe how an RTL design can be represented as an FSM.
We then show how an injected fault changes the FSM.
4.2.1 RTL Design as an FSM
We use M to denote both the RTL design as well as the corresponding FSM. Thus
M = 〈I, Z, V, si, δ, ρ〉, where I is the set of inputs, Z is the set of outputs, and
V is the set of state variables which induce the state space S = 2V . Let si be the
initial state of M . The transition function δ : 2V × 2I → 2V \∅ maps every state
and input assignment to a successor state, and ρ : 2V → 2Z is an output function
that maps each state to the set of outputs that are true in it. It is required that
I ∩ V = I ∩ Z = ∅; however, it is possible that Z ∩ V 6= ∅.
Given a k-cycle input sequence ξk = i0, i1, . . . , ik−1 ∈ (2I)k and a starting state
s0 ∈ S, M traverses a fixed sequence of states ℘ = s1, s2, . . . , sk ∈ Sk such that
δ(sj, ij) = sj+1 ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1.
The clock and reset input signals are not included in I . We further assume that
the reset input is synchronous and whenever it is asserted, M transitions to its
initial state si. It should be noted that I, V and Z contain only single-bit signals.
For a bit-vector in the RTL design, we add a signal for every bit of the vector.
The logic cone of a design output z is the set of all variables in the design that
affect z. We use Vz ⊆ V to denote the state variables in the logic cone of z.
Figure 4.2(a) shows an example Verilog RTL design. The corresponding FSM
is shown in Figure 4.2(b). Here, I = {a}, V = {v, z} and Z = {z}. We show
the value of input a on the edges, value of state variable v at the top of each state
and value of output z at the bottom of each state. Here we denote each state by
a vector formed by concatenating values of v and x. For example, if M is in the
state 00 (i.e. v = 0 and z = 0) when a = 1 is received, it goes to the state 10.
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Figure 4.2: (a) A Verilog RTL design and (b) the corresponding finite state
machine. In (b), we have shown the value of input a on the edges and the value
of the vector {v, z} inside each state. The bottom two states are not reachable
from the initial state.
The initial state of M is si = 00. When the two-cycle input sequence ξ2 = 0, 1 is
applied to M in the state 00, M traverses the state sequence ℘ = 11, 11.
It should be noted that the bottom two states in Figure 4.2(b) are unreachable
from the initial state. The significance of unreachable states for fault detection is
discussed later in Section 4.3.4.
4.2.2 Fault Model
We focus on soft errors in sequential elements. We consider only effective faults,
i.e. the faults that are able to flip the state of the sequential element.
Soft errors at sequential elements can be modeled as single event upsets (SEUs)
at corresponding state variables in the RTL design. An SEU at a variable corre-
sponds to a bit-flip in the variable at an arbitrary cycle of operation. The design
behaves normally during the remaining cycles.
We employ the single event upset fault model introduced in [71] to inject a fault
into a Verilog RTL design. The original RTL code is instrumented to achieve the
fault injection.
Consider a state variable v ∈ Vz in the design where we wish to inject a fault.
We define a new state variable SEU and a single-bit input injectSEU . SEU = 0
implies that the bit-flip at v has not yet occurred. In this state, if injectSEU is
1 in a particular cycle, v is flipped and SEU changes to 1. This is achieved
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by instrumenting assignments to v in the RTL code. In all subsequent cycles of
operation, since the fault has already taken place, the input injectSEU is simply
ignored and the design behaves normally. As a result, only in the first cycle in
which injectSEU is 1, an SEU is injected at v. The variable SEU thus limits the
fault to a single-event upset and prevents multiple bit-flips. Figure 4.3 models this
behavior as a finite state machine Mf . From now on, we refer to SEU at v simply
as a fault at v.
Figure 4.3: A finite state machine model for an SEU. The value of the input
injectSEU is shown on the edges and the value of the variable SEU is shown
inside each state.
We use Mv to denote the instrumented or faulty RTL design as well as the cor-
responding FSM. Mv = 〈I ′, Z ′, V ′, s′i, δ′, ρ′〉 is the product machine [89] obtained
by combining M and Mf . Therefore, I ′ = I ∪ {injectSEU}, Z ′ = Z, V ′ =
V ∪ {SEU} and s′i = si ∪ {SEU = 0}. The state space of Mv is denoted by
S ′ = 2V
′ . For s′ ∈ S ′ with SEU = 0, we define s′v to be the state which differs
from s′ only in the value of v and SEU . Values of all other state variables are
equal in states s′ and s′v. Thus, s
′
v is the faulty state corresponding to s
′.
When a fault is injected at v in the RTL design in Figure 4.2, the faulty design
formed is shown in Figure 4.4. We concatenate the values of inputs injectSEU
and a (in this order) to form an input vector which is shown on every edge in the
faulty design. Similarly, the values of state variables SEU and v are concatenated
and the resulting vector is shown at the top of each state. SinceMf has no outputs,
the only output is z, which is shown at the bottom of each state. The bottom three
states shaded blue have SEU = 1. Unreachable states in Mv are not shown since
they do not play a role in fault detection.
The top two states have SEU = 0, which means that the bit-flip at v has not
occurred. When Mv is in one of these states, its behavior is identical to M when-
ever injectSEU = 0. When injectSEU = 1, a bit-flip at v occurs and Mv
transitions to one of the shaded states. For example, suppose the input vector
(injectSEU, a) = 11 is received in state with (SEU, v, z) = 000. Since a = 1
and v = 0, the next state should also have v = 0 due to the self loop in Fig-
ure 4.2(b). However, injectSEU = 1 causes a bit-flip at v and the next state has
40
v = 1. Since the bit-flip has taken place, the SEU variable is set in the next state.
Finally, the next state has z = 0 because assignments to z are not modified while
constructing Mv.
Once Mv reaches one of the shaded states, the input injectSEU becomes a
‘don’t care’. This is evident from Figure 4.4 which shows that the behavior in each
of the three blue states is independent of the value of injectSEU . For example,
if a = 0 is received when Mv is in the state with (SEU, v, z) = 110, the next state
is 111, independent of the value of injectSEU .
Figure 4.4: Faulty design obtained after injecting a fault at v in the design in
Figure 4.2. Every transition is labeled with {injectSEU, a} vector. Every state
is labeled with {SEU, v, z} vector. States with SEU = 1 are shown in blue.
Unreachable states are not shown.
We use formal verification for evaluating fault coverage of a set of assertions.
Specifically, the true GoldMine assertions generated from the fault-free design are
checked against the faulty design. Formal verification exhaustively explores the
states in the faulty design to test the validity of each assertion. Due to the injected
fault, some of these assertions do not hold in the faulty design. These assertions
detect the injected fault. Similarly to the coverage definition in [36], this can be
formalized as follows.
Definition 3 An assertion A detects (covers) a fault at a state variable v ∈ V if
M |= A but Mv 6|= A.
Definition 4 Fault coverage of an assertionA is the fraction |Vdetected|V | where Vdetected =
{v ∈ V |M |= A ∧Mv 6|= A}.
Note that according to Definition 3, an assertion detects a fault if its antecedent
evaluates to true and consequent evaluates to false in the faulty design. In other
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words, the assertion is said to detect (cover) a fault at a state variable if it detects
the fault for some variable assignment that causes the antecedent to evaluate to
true.
We inject faults at all state variables in the logic cone of z. Since these state
variables correspond to sequential elements at circuit-level, our fault injection is
exhaustive w.r.t. all sequential elements that affect z. Since our fault injection is
based on a formal approach, we ensure that our fault injection is exhaustive w.r.t.
the time of occurrence of the faults at the state variables under consideration.
4.3 GoldMine Assertions as Fault Detectors
We now give insights into how a GoldMine assertion is able to detect the injected
faults. We first describe the format of temporal assertions generated by GoldMine.
Assertions in this format correspond to a set of state sequences in the design. If
one of these sequences is able to propagate a fault to the output, the assertion fails
in the faulty design and hence detects the fault.
4.3.1 Format of GoldMine Assertions
The temporal assertions generated by GoldMine are of a specific format and cor-
respond to a subset of all possible temporal assertions. In order to understand
how GoldMine assertions detect faults, it is necessary to analyze how this format
affects our fault injection and detection technique.
Let A : ant ⇒ con be a GoldMine temporal assertion generated for output z
which spans k + 1 cycles. Then ant is k cycles long and is of the form:
ant0 ∧X(ant1) ∧XX(ant2) ∧ . . . ∧XX . . .X(k − 1 times)(antk−1).
Each anti is a Boolean conjunction of propositions (variable-value pairs). More-
over, ant0 contains propositions on I ∪ V , but each anti for i = 1, . . . , k − 1
contains propositions on I . Thus the antecedent can contain propositions on the
state variables only in its initial cycle. In all subsequent cycles, it contains propo-
sitions involving the inputs only. When the values of state variables in the initial
cycle and values of inputs up to cycle i− 1 are specified, the value of a state vari-
able in cycle i is uniquely determined. As a result, the assertions can capture the
complete functionality of z over the previous k cycles even in the presence of this
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restriction. On the other hand, this restriction on ant helps in fault detection as
explained later in Section 4.3.3.
The consequent con is of the form:
XX . . .X(k times)(z) = 0 or
XX . . .X(k times)(z) = 1.
In other words, the consequent always consists of a single proposition on the
output. The decision tree-based algorithm used in the data mining stage of Gold-
Mine constructs a separate decision tree for each output, and as a result, the conse-
quents of the generated assertions satisfy this condition. It works to our advantage
during fault detection since we only focus on the faults that can propagate to a
given output. An assertion generated for z can therefore detect the effect of a fault
on z, which is the desired functionality of a fault detector.
4.3.2 State Sequences Covered by Assertions
Due to the specific format of A as described above, ant corresponds to a set of
starting states together with a set of k-cycle input sequences. Since ant0 can con-
tain a Boolean conjunction of propositions on the state variables, it corresponds
to a set of states in M . If all state variables are present in ant0, it corresponds to
a unique state. If none are present, it corresponds to all the states. Similarly, each
anti corresponds to a set of single cycle input patterns and together they constitute
a set of k-cycle input sequences. Consequently, ant corresponds to or covers a set
of state sequences (paths), one for every combination of starting states and input
sequences.
Since the faulty design Mv is constructed as a product machine of M and Mf ,
all inputs, state variables and outputs of M are present in Mv. Therefore, ant
corresponds to a set of state sequences in Mv as well.
For example, consider the assertion A1 : (v ∧ a)∧X(a)⇒ XX(z), generated
for design M (Figure 4.2). Here ant = (v ∧ a) ∧ X(a) and con = XX(z).
Figure 4.5(a) lists the starting state, input pattern and state sequence inM covered
by ant. Only the reachable states are considered as starting states. Since ant0
contains the proposition v = 1, 11 is the only possible starting state. Further
as ant0 and ant1 both contain the proposition a = 1, the only possible input
sequence is 1, 1.
The state sequences covered by ant in the faulty design Mv (Figure 4.4) are
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Figure 4.5: State sequences covered by the the antecedent ant of A1 in (a)
fault-free design M (Figure 4.2) and (b) faulty design Mv (Figure 4.4) for each
combination of starting states and input sequences covered by ant. The number
of state sequences in Mv is much larger than in M due to the additional signals
injectSEU and SEU .
listed in Figure 4.5(b). As ant0 does not contain any proposition on the state
variable SEU , it corresponds to three possible starting states, viz. 011, 110, 111.
Since neither of ant0 and ant1 contains a proposition on injectSEU , it can be
either 0 or 1 in each cycle of the two-cycle input sequence. The sets of starting
states and input sequences in turn lead to a set of 12 state sequences. It can be
seen that due to the additional signals in Mv, the same ant covers a larger number
of state sequences compared to M .
4.3.3 Fault Propagation to Output and Detection
Since we wish to use the assertions generated for outputs as fault detectors, the
propagation of a fault to the outputs is necessary for its detection. Specifically,
consider s′ ∈ S ′ with SEU = 0 and the corresponding faulty state s′v (Sec-
tion 4.2.2). Assume that s′ is reachable from the initial state s′i. Let ξr be an r-
cycle input sequence. Let s′, s′1, . . . , s
′
r and s
′
v, s
′
v1, . . . , s
′
vr be the state sequences
traversed when ξr is applied to Mv when it is in states s′ and s′v. Then if the values
of z in s′r and s
′
vr are not equal, we can say that ξr propagates the fault at v to the
output z. If no such s′ and ξr exist, the fault cannot propagate to z in r cycles.
Let A : ant⇒ con be a true assertion in M such that ant is k > r cycles long
44
and corresponds to a starting state s0 ∈ S ′ and a k-cycle input sequence ξk which
satisfy the following conditions:
• injectSEU = 0 in each cycle of ξk.
• ξk = ξk−r, ξr, i.e. the last r elements of ξk form ξr, and ξk−r is the corre-
sponding prefix sequence.
• When ξk−r is applied to Mv in state s0, the resulting state is s′.
Suppose A is being checked against Mv in formal verification as described in
Section 4.2.2. Due to ξk, the state sequence explored is s0, . . . , s′, s′1, . . . , s
′
r. The
consequent con corresponds to the value of z in s′r. Since A is generated from
M , ant does not contain any proposition on injectSEU . Therefore, ant also
corresponds to an input sequence which is identical to ξk except for the value
of injectSEU in cycle k − r. Due to this input sequence, the explored state
sequence is s0, . . . , s′v, s
′
v1, . . . , s
′
vr. In this case, ant is true while con is false.
Consequently, Mv 6|= A and since M |= A, A detects the fault at v.
We illustrate the fault propagation and detection with an example. Let s′ = 011
and the corresponding faulty state s′v = 101, which differs from s
′ only in the
values of SEU and v. When the single-cycle input sequence ξ1 = 01 is applied
to Mv in state s′ and s′v, values of z in the resulting state are 1 and 0, respectively.
Therefore, ξ1 propagates the fault at v to z.
From Figure 4.5(b) for A1, consider the starting state s0 = 011 and the two-
cycle input sequence ξ2 = 01, 01. The last element of ξ2 forms ξ1 and the prefix
sequence is also ξ′1 = 01. When ξ2 is applied to Mv in s0, the state sequence
followed is 011, 011, 011. In the last state, z = 1, which agrees with the conse-
quent of A1. If ξ2 is modified by changing the value of injectSEU in cycle 1,
the resulting input sequence 11, 01 gives rise to the state sequence 011, 101, 100
(Figure 4.6). In the last state, z = 0. Therefore A1 is declared false in formal
verification, thus detecting the fault.
We can now explain how the format of GoldMine temporal assertions helps
in fault detection. As described in Section 4.3.1, the antecedent of a GoldMine
assertion can contain propositions on state variables only in the first cycle. If this
condition is relaxed, GoldMine can generate an assertion A1′ given by
A1′ : (v ∧ a) ∧X(v ∧ a)⇒ XX(z)
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Figure 4.6: Fault at v detected by A1 for the design from Figure 4.4.
instead of A1 but which captures the same behavior in M as A1. Note that the
state variable v is present in the second cycle of the antecedent of A1′. When
the input sequence 11, 01 is applied while A1′ is being checked against Mv, ant
becomes false in the second cycle. As a result, A1′ is declared true and fails to
detect the fault at v.
4.3.4 Fault Detection due to Newly Reachable States
We find that the presence of a fault makes some states that are unreachable in
the original design reachable in the faulty design. These newly reachable states
facilitate the detection of additional faults. We illustrate this phenomenon using
the example design of Figure 4.2.
From the discussion in Section 4.3.3, for an assertion to detect a fault at v that
propagates to output z in r cycles, the assertion must span at least (r + 1) cycles.
However, if an unreachable state in M becomes reachable in Mv, it is possible
that a shorter assertion detects the fault.
The fault at v in the example design M of Figure 4.2 takes one cycle to propa-
gate to z and therefore requires two-cycle assertions for detection.
If a mining window of one cycle is used while generating assertions, the fol-
lowing is one of the true assertions:
A2 : v ∧ a⇒ X(z).
It can be observed from Figure 4.2 that A2 is not true starting from the state
{v, z} = 10. However, since this state is not reachable from the initial state, A2 is
proved true in M .
In the faulty design Mv, the state {SEU, v, z} = 110 is reachable from the
initial state. In other words, the state with v = 1, z = 0 which was previously
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unreachable has become reachable due to the fault. When the one-cycle input
sequence ξ = 1 covered by A2 is applied to Mv in this state, z = 0 in the next
cycle. Therefore, A2 is declared false in Mv, thus detecting the fault at v. Note
that here the fault at v which propagates to z in one cycle is detected by A2 which
spans only one cycle.
In general, some faults that propagate to the output in r cycles get detected by
assertions generated from a mining window of r cycles. This helps in reducing
the memory and time costs of the fault detector generation process.
4.4 Experimental Results
We demonstrate our fault coverage evaluation and fault criticality estimation ap-
proach on the control state machine of an end node of the SpaceWire [88] network.
For GoldMine, a mining window of three cycles was used for the SpaceWire ex-
periments. We generated assertions for four outputs of the module: RST tx o,
err sqc, enTx o and enRx o. Faults were injected at 25 state bits that are in the
logic cone of all outputs under consideration. Cadence IFV was used as the for-
mal verifier for fault experiments. Experiments were performed on an Intel Core
2 Quad with 16 GB RAM.
4.4.1 Fault Coverage Based Ranking
We ranked the assertions generated for SpaceWire FSM where assertions detect-
ing (≤10%), (10%-20%), (20%-30%) and (>30%) faults were assigned ranks 1,
2, 3 and 4, respectively. We then computed the percentage of assertions belonging
to each rank (Figure 4.7). In this experiment, most of the assertions (82%) have
rank 1 or 2, i.e. they detect up to 20% of injected faults. However, there are 4%
assertions belonging to rank 4 and we have also found that about 6% of those
detect more than 80% of the injected faults.
4.4.2 Fault Criticality
In Figure 4.8, we show the percentage of total assertions generated (Dz) for each
output of SpaceWire FSM that detect a given fault. This number gives an estimate
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Figure 4.7: Percentage of total assertions belonging to each rank. Rank 1 :
≤10% faults detected, Rank 2: 10%-20% faults detected, Rank 3: 20%-30%
faults detected and Rank 4: >30% faults detected.
of criticality or importance of the fault for overall design vulnerability. The faults
considered are in the combined logic cone of all the outputs. For the variables
state[5:0] and timer[13:0], the number of assertions is averaged over
individual bits.
We can see from the figure that a relatively high percentage of assertions (25% -
78%) detect faults at variable state. Therefore, faults at state would be most
critical for all outputs considered. This is confirmed by the RTL description which
shows a direct dependence of these outputs on state. The variable state is
used as a switching variable of a case statement in the RTL. Since the rest of the
variables can only affect the outputs by changing state, a lower percentage of
assertions detect faults at those variables (up to 31%).
In [71], the authors have demonstrated that manually written assertions based
on the SpaceWire specifications were not able to detect a fault at HASgotBit.
GoldMine assertions, however, manage to detect this fault. At the same time,
Figure 4.8 also illustrates that this fault is hard to detect, by showing a very low
percentage of assertions detecting this fault (0.02% - 4%), thereby confirming the
inference in [71].
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Figure 4.8: Percentage of generated assertions that detect a particular fault for
SpaceWire control FSM. Fault at the highlighted variable could not be detected
by a set of manually written assertions as reported in [71].
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CHAPTER 5
CODE COVERAGE EXTRACTION FROM
EMULATION AND PROTOTYPING
PLATFORMS
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we define our work for code coverage extraction from emulation
and prototyping platforms. We apply our simulation based coverage analysis tech-
nique from Section 3.4 to determine the mapping of conditional statements in the
RTL code to the rest of the code. Simulation based coverage for an assertion (Def-
inition 1) relates the triggering of an assertion to the execution of statements in the
code, where triggering refers to the antecedent condition evaluating to true. We
extend this definition to the conditions that are part of if and case statements in
the code. Since conditions are encoded as decision nodes in the CFG framework
(Section 3.2), we refer to the condition evaluating to true as the triggering of the
corresponding decision node.
For each decision node, we identify the set of statements such that triggering
of the decision node ensures execution of these statements. This set consists of
the statements that must be executed for the decision node to trigger (backward
cone) and the statements conditioned on the decision node (forward cone). This
static analysis is performed in a way that the coverage from our technique closely
approximates the statement coverage reported by a simulator.
We add a block of code to record the triggering of each decision node which
gets synthesized into additional logic. During emulation, we use the added logic
to identify the decision nodes that triggered during running of a test. This trigger
information is cross referenced with the source code to compute code coverage
statistics.
The total area cost of the added logic is roughly proportional to the number of
decision nodes. In order to keep the area overheads under control, we optimize
the set of decision nodes according to user specified constraints. These “knobs”
allow the user to make the best use of the resources available on the emulation
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platform.
We demonstrate our technique through experiments on an industrial design em-
ulated on a Xilinx FPGA platform. We use a signal processing module that gener-
ates timing recovery strobes for a receiver front end. The runtime of our technique
was within 30 seconds for the design with a few thousand lines of source code,
which shows that the technique is scalable and efficient. The code coverage re-
ported using our technique is compared to that from an RTL simulator. We find
that with around 10% FPGA usage overhead, the error in reported coverage by our
technique is within 2% on average. Moreover, using optimization, the overhead
can be reduced at the cost of slightly higher error.
5.2 Motivating Example
We motivate the application of simulation based coverage computation to cover-
age extraction during emulation through a simple example. Consider the example
Verilog code in Figure 5.1. This is a code snippet from module usbf pa of a
USB design downloaded from [43].
Figure 5.1: Verilog RTL code snippet from module usbf pa of a USB design
downloaded from [43]. clk, rst, send data are inputs and the remaining
variables are internal variables.
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Now suppose that this design is downloaded onto an FPGA platform and an
emulation test is applied to it. Our aim is to find the statement coverage of the
test, i.e. statements executed during this emulation run.
A naı¨ve approach is to add logic for each statement to determine if it was ever
executed and to add a bit to record it. Clearly, the approach is infeasible due to
the prohibitive area overheads. However, if we identify some key points in the
code so that execution of these points ensures execution of a set of statements, the
overheads can be greatly reduced by only recording the execution of these points.
We find that the conditional statements in the code can effectively serve as such
key points.
For example, consider the decision node d for line 13: if (send zero len-
gth r && send data). Since this condition depends on the condition on
line 11 (state==IDLE), the full expression for decision node is represented as
(state==IDLE)&&(send zero length r==1)&&(send data==1).
We add logic to record if the condition ever evaluates to true (d ever triggers) dur-
ing an emulation run. Given that d triggered during the emulation run, we can
infer the following:
(1) Since state had value IDLE, the statements on line 5 were executed, in-
cluding the initial assignment to state. Although send zero length r
held value 1, it is not sufficient to conclude that the assignment on line 3
was executed, since the assigned value (input send zero length) is un-
known in that case.
(2) Assignments on lines 14 through 16 were also executed since they are con-
ditioned on d.
(3) Assignments on line 9, other continuous assignments and unconditional
statements inside other always blocks (actual statements not shown for clar-
ity) were also executed. The assignment on line 3 was also executed. This is
because such statements are always executed, independent of the triggering
of d.
Note that the sets of statements in (1), (2) and (3) above are similar to the
backward, forward and ancillary cones introduced in Definition 1. Thus using
algorithms similar to the correctness based coverage computation (Section 3.4),
these sets for each decision node can be determined from static analysis prior
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to emulation. The trigger information from the emulation run can then be cross
referenced with the RTL code using these sets to estimate the statement coverage
of the test.
Moreover, it can be seen that recording the triggering of one decision node can
give us information about coverage of seven statements (excluding the ones in the
ancillary cone). This gives an insight into the effectiveness of using the decision
nodes as the key points to record coverage.
5.3 Methodology
Figure 5.2 illustrates the main steps in our methodology to extract code coverage
from emulation and prototyping platforms. Given a Verilog RTL design, we parse
the design files to construct Control Flow Graphs (CFGs) augmented with vari-
able dependency information for each module (Section 5.3.1). We also extract
conditional statements as decision nodes from the CFGs in this step, which are
candidates for synthesis. The CFGs are then traversed to obtain the RTL lines
covered by each decision node (Section 5.3.2). The optimization step involves
identifying a subset of decision nodes that satisfies coverage and size constraints
(Section 5.3.3). Finally, logic to record triggering of the optimized set of decision
nodes is added to the design (Section 5.3.4). The design is synthesized on the
target emulation platform and code coverage statistics are derived from the trigger
information (Section 5.3.5).
5.3.1 Extended CFG Construction
We reuse the extended CFG framework described in Section 3.2 in this case. For
the design under consideration, we construct extended CFGs for each of the con-
stituent modules.
We extract the conditional statements in the RTL code in the form of decision
nodes in the CFG. Recall that in a CFG, a decision node represents conditional
statements, i.e. if and case statements in the source code.
We refer to the conditional expression for a decision node evaluating to true as
triggering of the decision node. In general, the CFG can contain nested decision
nodes. In order for a decision node to trigger, other decision nodes on the path
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Figure 5.2: Block diagram describing the overall flow of our technique of
coverage extraction from emulation.
from a top level node to that decision node need to trigger. Therefore, conditional
expressions for such nodes are included in the representation of that decision node.
Figure 5.3 shows the CFG for the module shown from Figure 5.1. It consists of
the CFGs for the three always processes starting at lines 2, 4 and 7.
It can be seen that each statement in the code is mapped to a node in the CFG.
Nodes corresponding to if and case are decision nodes (shaded).
Although not shown in Figure 5.3, we map terminal else statements to sep-
arate decision nodes. The conditional expression for such a node is the negation
of the conditional expression for the corresponding if decision node. For ex-
ample, for the always process starting at line 4, the decision nodes are d1:
(reset==1) and d2: (reset==0).
5.3.2 Estimating Coverage of Decision Nodes
For each decision node, we find the set of statements such that during running of
a test, the triggering of the decision node ensures execution of these statements.
Note that this is similar to the result set of an assertion according to the simulation
based coverage metric defined in Section 3.3.1. Therefore, we define coverage of
a decision node on the same lines as Definition 1.
Definition 5 (Decision node coverage) A statement s is covered by a decision
node d if it belongs to one of the following categories.
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Figure 5.3: Control flow graph for the example RTL design from Figure 5.1
augmented with data flow information in the form of assignments (dashed line)
and decisions (dash dot) and initial assignment (dotted line) for
variables. For clarity, this information is shown only for the internal variable
state.
(1) s must be executed in order for the conditional expression for d to evaluate
to true.
(2) s is executed because the conditional expression for d evaluates to true.
(3) s is executed irrespective of the evaluation of the conditional expression of
d.
(4) s does not belong to the above 3 categories, but execution of a statement
from (1) or (2) ensures the execution of s.
We call the set of statements falling in categories (1) and (2) as the backward
cone and the forward cone of the decision node, respectively. We use the term
ancillary cone to denote the statements belonging to categories (3) and (4).
We attempt to express the conditional expression for a decision node as a propo-
sition or conjunctions of propositions. If this is possible, the coverage of decision
nodes is computed using the algorithms described in Section 3.4. Triggering of
an assertion requires its antecedent to evaluate to true, while for a decision node
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to trigger, the corresponding conditional expression must evaluate to true. There-
fore, the backward and forward cone computation algorithms in Section 3.4 can
be reused for decision nodes, where the conditional expression for the decision
node is used in place of the antecedent.
We demonstrate our algorithm to find coverage of decision nodes in the exam-
ple from Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.3. We again consider the decision node d for line
11: if (send zero length r && send data). Since this is a nested
condition, the expression for decision node is represented as (state==IDLE)
&& (send zero length r==1) && (send data==1). Note that in this
case, d is represented as a conjunction of propositions. Therefore, we use the
algorithms in Section 3.4 for coverage computation.
Backward cone (Bd) computation: We run the GetBackConeProposition(G,
p) procedure with p: (state==IDLE)which is the only proposition in d involv-
ing internal variables. GetMatchingAssignments(G, p) returns with the single
initial assignment on line 5. Since exactly one matching assignment is found, we
include the statement on line 5 in Bd. Also since the right hand side of the assign-
ment is a constant, no recursive call is made onGetBackConeProposition(). We
then traverse upwards starting from the CFG node mapped to line 5 and stop at the
top level node. Running GetBackConeProposition() with p: (send zero l-
ength r==1) does not add more statements to Bd, since the assignment on line
3 assigns an unknown value (input send zero length) to send zero le-
ngth r.
Forward cone (Fd) computation: We identify the always process starting at
line 7 as one containing decisions involving the variables in d. Starting at the top
level node, we traverse downwards. The decision at line 10 can be evaluated using
the proposition (state==IDLE) and we take the left edge. The decision at line
13 evaluates to true and therefore we take the left edge again. Statements on lines
10 and 13 visited thus far are included in Fd. The assignments on lines 14 as well
as on 15 and 16 (not shown in the CFG) are also included in Fd. Forward cone
computation stops at this point.
Ancillary cone (Ad) computation: In the first step, we include statements on
line 9 (actual assignments not shown) and line 3. All continuous assignments in
the module are also included in Ad in this step. In this case, the second step does
not add any lines to Ad.
Figure 5.4 shows the CFG nodes included in Bd (blue), Fd (pink) and Ad (yel-
low) among the ones shown in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.4: CFG from Figure 5.3 with nodes included in backward cone (blue),
forward cone (pink) and ancillary cone (yellow) of d: (state==IDLE &&
send zero length r==1 && send data==1) shown.
If the conditional expression for a decision node is too complex to be expressed
as a conjunction of propositions, we resort to simpler versions of the algorithms
as follows.
Backward Cone It is not possible to compute the backward cone of a decision
node if it is not expressed as a conjunction of propositions. In this case, we
simply set it to ∅.
Forward Cone To compute the forward cone of a decision node in this case, we
traverse the CFG downwards starting from the decision node until another
decision node is encountered. The statements corresponding to the visited
nodes are included in the forward cone.
Ancillary Cone Since the ancillary cone computation described in Section 3.4.3
is not based on propositions, it does not change in this case.
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5.3.3 Optimization
It is possible to have multiple decision nodes covering the same statement. To
compute coverage accurately, we require at least one decision node covering each
statement. Moreover, synthesizing the trigger logic for decision nodes incurs area
costs. Therefore we perform optimization to obtain a subset of the decision nodes
that satisfy certain user defined constraints. Specifically, we find a subset of deci-
sion nodes with maximum total coverage that satisfies the following constraints:
1. Total number of decision nodes ≤ Nmax.
2. Fraction of total lines covered in the RTL code for each module ≥ Cmin.
Here Nmax and Cmin are user-specified.
This problem is identified as a variant of the Maximum coverage problem and
is formulated as an Integer Linear Program (ILP) [90]. This ILP is solved to get
the final set of decision nodes, denoted by Dopt.
Let M0,M1, . . . be the modules that constitute the target RTL design and LM0 ,
LM1 , . . . the sets of lines in the RTL code for these modules, respectively. Then
L = LM0 ∪ LM1 ∪ . . . = {l0, l1, . . .} is the set of all lines in the design.
Let D = {d0, d1, . . .} be the set of all decision nodes and Ld0 , Ld1 , . . . be the
sets of RTL lines covered by these decision nodes, respectively.
Our goal is to find the set Dopt ⊆ D that covers the set of lines Lopt ⊆ L and
satisfies the conditions mentioned above.
We define two sets of binary variables, viz. {x0, x1, . . .} and {y0, y1, . . .}. xi =
1 if di ∈ Dopt and 0 otherwise. Similarly, yj = 1 if lj ∈ Lopt and 0 otherwise. The
ILP is then formulated as follows.
Maximize
∑
yj
subject to:∑
xi ≤ Nmax;
∀lj,
∑
lj∈Ldi xi ≥ yj;
∀Mi, |LMi ∩ Lopt| ≥ Cmin × |LMi |;
∀i, xi ∈ {0, 1};
∀j, yj ∈ {0, 1};
We use the MATLAB solver bintprog() to solve this ILP.
Note that when Cmin < 1 is used, there could be statements in the code not
covered by any decision node in the Dopt. As a result, the coverage information
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for such statements extracted from emulation may not be accurate. However,
fewer decision nodes may be required in this case, which reduces the area cost.
This trade-off between accuracy of coverage results and area cost is demonstrated
by the case study in Section 5.4.
5.3.4 Decision Node Synthesis
We add a variable cov di to record the triggering of each decision node di ∈
Dopt. The RTL code added is shown in Figure 5.5. When reset is asserted,
cov di is initialized to 0. When the condition corresponding to di evaluates
to true during running of a test, cov di is set to 1. Thus at the end of the test, the
value of cov di denotes if the decision node di was ever triggered. The value
must be captured before subsequent resets since a reset clears cov di.
Figure 5.5: RTL code to record triggering of decision node di with conditional
expression cond di.
5.3.5 Coverage Extraction from Emulation
The target design is synthesized with the additional trigger logic for decision
nodes and loaded onto an FPGA. The additional logic consists of a flip-flop for
cov di along with some combinational logic for the condition in di. An emula-
tion test is run on the FPGA, and at the end the values of cov di flip-flops are
extracted.
The subset Dtrig = {di ∈ Dopt|cov di= 1} gives the set of decision nodes
that triggered during the test. Let Sdi be the set of statements covered by decision
node di, which is already available from the coverage estimation step. Therefore,
we can find the set Scov =
⋃
di∈Dtrig Sdi of statements that were definitely executed
during the test. Let Ssim be the set of statements reported as covered by a simulator
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for the same test. Note that Scov may not include all the lines in Ssim, but is
guaranteed to be a conservative estimate, or in other words Scov ⊆ Ssim.
From Scov, the standard code coverage metric of statement coverage, i.e. frac-
tion of RTL statements executed, can be obtained directly. Moreover, since each
decision node corresponds to a condition or branch in the RTL code, branch cov-
erage can also be derived from Dtrig.
5.4 Case Study: An Industrial Design
We evaluated our methodology using an industrial RTL design. We considered
a signal processing module that generates timing recovery strobes for a receiver
front end. The sub-blocks included state machines, counters and math computa-
tions.
Experiments were carried out on an Intel Xeon Quad Core @ 3.16 GHz with 32
GB RAM running Red Hat Linux v2.6. Starting from the design files, generating
the trigger logic for final decision nodes completed within 30 seconds.
We used MATLAB solver bintprog() for optimization. Xilinx FPGA plat-
form was used to emulate the original design as well as the modified design
with the additional trigger logic for decision nodes (Section 5.3.4). The values
of cov di flip-flops were extracted using the Xilinx ChipScope tool. For com-
parison of code coverage statistics, we used the ModelSim RTL simulator.
5.4.1 Decision Node Generation and Optimization
Table 5.1 shows the number of lines, number of total decision nodes and number
of decision nodes after optimization for the 6 RTL modules M1 through M6 be-
longing to the design block under consideration. Column 3 denotes the number
of lines actually considered for coverage. This includes lines of code contain-
ing assignments and conditional statements and excludes blank lines, comments,
variable declarations, module instantiation and port connections, etc. Note that
modules with sequential code are considered, since we need the clock and reset
signals present only in sequential modules for trigger logic.
Table 5.1 shows the code size and number of decision nodes for the modules
under consideration.
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Table 5.1: Number of lines and decision nodes before and after optimization for
each RTL module. Column 3 denotes the number of statements considered for
coverage. Decision node optimization is performed for two configurations (1)
Cmin = 1 and (2) Cmin = 0.9, Nmax = 256.
Module Lines
Statements
for cover-
age
Total deci-
sion nodes
Decision
nodes for
config. (1)
Decision
nodes for
config. (2)
M1 1855 927 177 177 85
M2 271 3 2 2 2
M3 254 85 40 39 38
M4 195 50 15 15 10
M5 588 210 108 95 80
M6 907 255 62 59 26
We ran decision node optimization with two configurations (Columns 4 and
5 in Table 5.1). In configuration (1), Cmin = 1 was used, which ensures that
all statements are covered by Dopt. The total number of decision nodes in this
case was 411. This was done in order to prune out redundant decision nodes
while keeping the coverage target to 100%. In optimization configuration (2), we
relaxed the per module coverage constraint to 90% (Cmin = 0.9) and bounded the
total number of decision nodes by a number smaller than 411 (Nmax = 256).
Optimization for configuration (1) reduced the number of decision nodes only
for M3, M5 and M6. For remaining modules, there were no redundant decision
nodes. In other words, each decision node covered a statement not covered by
any other decision node. Configuration (2) showed reduction in the number of
decision nodes in nearly all modules. The reduction is more significant in M1 and
M6. This is because they contain decision nodes that add very little extra coverage,
and hence the 90% coverage target can be met even after removing those.
5.4.2 FPGA Overheads
Table 5.2 summarizes the FPGA usage overheads of trigger logic for both opti-
mization configurations. The usage is expressed in terms of lookup table (LUT)
and flip-flop (FD LD) counts. Changes in the usage of the remaining FPGA prim-
itives were insignificant. The FD LD overhead mainly corresponds to the actual
cov di flip-flops to store trigger information. The overhead in LUT counts is
due to additional combinational logic to record the triggering.
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Table 5.2: Percentage FPGA usage overheads of trigger logic for the set of
decision nodes optimized for configurations (1) Cmin = 1 and (2) Cmin = 0.9,
Nmax = 256.
Usage primitive Overhead for config. (1) Overhead for config. (2)
LUT 3.28% 2.71%
FD LD 9.21% 5.36%
We find that the overheads are within 10% in all cases. Moreover, the overheads
for configuration (2) are up to 42% lower than (1), which shows how decision
node optimization can help lower overheads. As expected, the FD LD overhead
is found to be roughly proportional to the number of decision nodes for which
trigger information is being recorded (411 and 256 for the two configurations).
Table 5.1 shows that for most modules, the number of decision nodes is much
smaller (up to 5x for M1) than the number of statements. This illustrates the
benefit of static analysis to identify coverage extraction logic. In the absence
of such analysis, logic to record triggering of each statement would be required
for coverage extraction. Since we map decision nodes to statements and record
triggering of decision nodes alone, we can extract the same coverage information
at much lower FPGA area overheads.
5.4.3 Code Coverage Comparison with Simulator
We ran a system level test (Test 1) on the modified designs corresponding to con-
figurations (1) and (2) and collected trigger information for all decision nodes.
The trigger information was mapped back to the source code to determine state-
ments executed during the test. The same test on the original design was run in
a simulator, and code coverage information was obtained from the simulator. For
modified design for configuration (2), the process was repeated for a much longer
system level test (Test 2).
Comparison between the statement coverage reported from emulation and by
the simulator revealed that, in all cases, coverage obtained from emulation is in-
deed a conservative estimate of the actual coverage from simulation. We report the
number of statements that were covered according to the simulator but reported
as not covered by our technique as a percentage of total number of statements.
We report detailed results for Test 1 in Table 5.3. When decision nodes with
optimization configuration (1) were used, the average error was only 1.8%. A
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Table 5.3: Percentage error in line coverage extracted from FPGA using decision
nodes for optimization configurations (1) and (2) for Test 1 and configuration (2)
for Test 2. The error represents the number of covered statements not reported
using our method as a percentage of number of statements (Column 3 in
Table 5.1).
Simulation
runtime
Emulation
runtime Module
Error for
config. (1)
Error for
config. (2)
Test 1 3 hours 30 seconds
M1 0.22% 0.86%
M2 0% 0%
M3 4.71% 5.88%
M4 4% 4%
M5 2.86% 2.86%
M6 0.78% 7.06%
Test 2 20 hours 5 minutes Average - 3.80%
more detailed analysis showed that the discrepancy between coverages can be
mainly attributed to some default cases of combinational case statements.
The cov di flip-flops require a reset in order to start recording triggering of deci-
sion nodes. Therefore, for the default cases that were hit before reset was asserted,
the corresponding flip-flops failed to record triggering.
As expected, the error in reported coverage was found to be slightly higher
when a lower number of decision nodes were used. Table 5.1 shows that for
optimization configuration (2), the number of decision nodes was significantly
lower compared to configuration (1) for modulesM1 andM6. Table 5.3 shows that
this resulted in around three and nine times increase in error in reported coverage.
However, for other modules, the increase in error was less significant. Therefore,
the average error increased only to 3.8% from 1.8%. From this observation, we
can conclude that our technique can report meaningful code coverage estimates
with reduced overheads.
We observed similar coverage statistics for Test 2. In Table 5.3, we only report
the average error in coverage across all modules in this case.
Note that running a test in emulation is about 300x faster than simulation. In
particular, Test 2 has a prohibitively large runtime of 20 hours during simulation.
However, we are able to obtain coverage statistics within 4% error from emulation
for this test as well, thus illustrating the key benefit of our technique.
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CHAPTER 6
RESOURCES
This chapter gives instructions on obtaining and using our tools for code cover-
age and fault coverage analysis of assertions. Sources for the tools are available at:
http://users.crhc.illinois.edu/athaval1
Both tools run on Linux and require perl and gcc/g++. The code coverage
tool requires flex and bison for Verilog parsing. The fault coverage tool re-
quires the formal verifier Cadence IFV. The tools have been tested on Debian
Linux 2.6.32-5-amd64 running perl v5.8.7, gcc/g++ v4.4.5,
flex v2.5.35, GNU Bison v2.4.1 and IFV v08.20-s021.
6.1 Using the Code Coverage Tool
Follow these steps to run the code coverage tool:
1. Download the source from:
http://users.crhc.illinois.edu/athaval1
/code coverage.tar.gz.
2. In a terminal, navigate to the download directory and type:
$tar -zxvf code coverage.tar.gz
This creates a directory called code coverage. Navigate to this direc-
tory.
3. To compile, type:
$make
4. For a quick run, type:
$perl ccover.pl -metric=fv example.v example.assert
64
This step runs correctness based coverage analysis for the assertion in file
example.assert for the design in example.v and prints the covered
statements to the terminal.
5. For detailed instructions and more options, please see the README file in
the source directory.
6.2 Using the Fault Coverage Tool
Follow these steps to run the fault coverage tool:
1. Download the source from:
http://users.crhc.illinois.edu/athaval1
/fault coverage.tar.gz.
2. In a terminal, navigate to the download directory and type:
$tar -zxvf fault coverage.tar.gz
This creates a directory called fault coverage. Navigate to this direc-
tory.
3. To compile, type:
$make
4. For a quick run, type:
$perl fcover.pl example.v example.assert
This step first instruments the design source in example.v so that SEU
faults can be injected at each state variable. The instrumented source is
then used to inject faults in state variables one at a time to determine if
the assertion in file example.assert detects the fault. Results showing
faults detected by the assertion are printed to the terminal.
5. For detailed instructions and more options, please see the README file in
the source directory.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
The work presented in this thesis attempts to extend the coverage analysis used
for simulation based verification to two other major components of pre-silicon
verification: assertion based verification and emulation and prototyping.
Code coverage metrics are defined for each of the two use cases of assertions,
viz. simulation and formal verification. Coverage analysis is performed through a
direct analysis of the CFG constructed from an RTL design as opposed to previous
approaches that either use the state transition graph [32, 33] or an indirect muta-
tion analysis [18]. The same CFG framework is reused to identify key recording
points in the design to increase observability and enable efficient code coverage
estimation during emulation and prototyping. A formal technique to rank the au-
tomatically generated assertions on the basis of fault detection is also presented.
Experiments with an industrial design and open source designs from Open-
Cores [43] demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed techniques. For USB
2.0 and OpenRISC open source designs, our code coverage analysis technique for
assertions effectively finds the statements truly relevant to the correctness of an
assertion. For an industrial design, our technique for coverage extraction emula-
tion reports code coverage within 2% error around 10% FPGA usage overhead.
Experiments with SpaceWire protocol [88] design show that our fault detection
based ranking technique for GoldMine [40] identifies 4% high-quality assertions
that detect >30% of the injected faults.
This work is only an initial step towards a unified coverage analysis for pre-
silicon verification. As with the statement coverage metric, coverage analysis for
other coverage metrics is needed in the context of assertion and emulation based
verification. Such an approach is necessary to assess the overall progress of the
various verification activities and identify parts of the design that need further
attention, be it in the form of a more comprehensive test suite or high- quality
assertions. Together, these improvements will help achieve coverage closure and
ensure correctness of the design before synthesizing it onto costly silicon.
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